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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the U.S. military is fully 
integrating information operations in combat operations.  Using the organizational 
theories of Henry Mintzberg and the work of  Richard Daft as one frame of reference and 
the information theories of Claude Shannon, John Diebold, and Martin Libicki as the 
second frame of reference, this thesis produced testable propositions to determine which 
theory had a greater  ability to explain the degree of integration as seen in the four case 
studies of Operation Joint Guard/Forge (Bosnia), Operation Enduring Freedom-
Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.   
This study concludes that both the organizational and information theories explain 
how and why military commanders integrate IO successfully into combat operations and 
contains insights drawn from this study to include: without the proper command 
atmosphere, the integration of information operations will simply not occur.  
Commanders who do not believe in the usefulness of IO will focus on kinetic operations 
instead of a full spectrum view, which uses all the elements of combat power and the 
increased speed and reliability of information that passes from the human network 
(physical) to the computer network and from the tactical level to the strategic levels.  This 
full spectrum view allows commanders and staffs alike to understand and integrate IO 
into combat operations more effectively. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. FOREWORD 
The U.S. Army has been wrestling with information operations since the concept 
formally appeared in August 1995, when the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) released Pamphlet 525-69, “Concept for Information Operations.”1  Since its 
inception, the concept has evolved in the face of numerous adversaries.  Yet information 
operations (IO) is now nearly on a par tactically, operationally, and strategically with 
“kinetic” operations.  This is evident by General William Wallace’s comments in the 
March-April 2008 Military Review where he stated; “FM 3-0 revises how the Army 
views information operations and the staff responsibility for the tasks associated with 
them.  The current age of increased information technology, interconnected global 
commerce, and trade exponentially increases the impact of the information environment 
on operations.”2  
 The operational environment is progressing so quickly that traditional 
commanders who are trained to conduct kinetic operations often fail to recognize the 
inseparable connection between kinetic action and the second and third order effects it 
has on the adversary, the civilian population, and the personnel back home.  The lack of 
understanding of information effects by traditional commanders has led to a greater need 
to rely on the IO practitioners and their ability to bring the tools of information operations 
to bear in military operations.  This has caused many to believe the role of the IO 
practitioner is important enough to synchronize effects but not important enough to fully 
integrate with operations. 
 Commanders in the field who realized the importance of these powerful tools 
began trying to use IO in operations as early as Desert Shield in 1990, followed by Desert 
Storm in 1991,3 and continuing to the present day and the War on Terror.  However, 
                                                 1 Department of the Army, Pamphlet 525-69, Concept for Information Operations, 1995. 
2 William Wallace, General.  FM 3-0 Army Operations; The Army’s Blueprint, Military Review 
March-April 2008: 6. 
3 History and Evolution of IO, Prepared by the Joint IO Center, January 2000. 
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according to many IO professionals, the implementation and integration of information 
operations has fallen much shorter than anticipated while prosecuting the war on 
terrorism.  This is not from lack of effort to integrate IO; rather it lies in the confusion 
about this way of fighting.  To accomplish the task of integration across the spectrum of 
warfare, information operations must become organic to full spectrum warfare from the 
soldiers at the tactical Brigade Combat Team (BCT), to the strategic leaders in the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense. 
B. SAMPLES OF SECTIONS 
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the U.S. military is fully 
integrating information operations (IO) from the soldiers at the tactical BCT, to the 
strategic leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  In an operational environment 
where technology is drastically improving the ability of adversaries to conduct IO against 
the U.S., the success of U.S. military IO will depend not only on the higher-echelon 
commander and his planning staff, but also on the soldiers and junior leaders beneath him 
who must comprehend and execute it.   
 This paper provides a historical overview of information operations and its 
marriage to the military using the work of Henry Mintzberg and Richard Daft as an 
organizational frame of reference and the theories of Claude Shannon, John Diebold, and 
Martin Libicki as an informational frame of reference.  It then produced testable 
Propositions that analyze four case studies to determine which frame of reference has a 
greater impact on the integration of IO into combat operations.  The author realizes that a 
fully integrated information operations strategy requires synchronization, coordination, 
and or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with 
military operations to achieve unity of effort.4  Strategic guidance and desired end states 
come from the President of the United States and the National Security Council and then 
passed to combatant commanders, who play a pivotal role in unifying (integrating) 
actions.  However, subordinate commanders also may integrate and synchronize strategic 
                                                 4 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Personnel Support to Joint Operations, Joint Publication 1-0.  Washington 
D.C.  October 16, 2006.    
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guidance directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and 
nonmilitary organizations in their area of operations.5  While a truly integrated strategy 
involves the application of all instruments of national power, this thesis focuses on 
information operations within the U.S. military and, more specifically, the information 
operations structure within the U.S. Army.  
C. SECTIONS OVERVIEW 
 Chapter I:  Introduction 
 This chapter provides the purpose and scope of the thesis (examining whether the 
U.S. military is fully integrating information operations [IO]); it will then provide a 
chapter overview highlighting topics covered during the study.  
 Chapter II:  Background  
 This chapter examines the evolution of information operations from Information 
Warfare (IW) and Command and Control Warfare (C2W) to information operations, and 
the recognition of the critical role of information as an element of national power through 
the full spectrum of peace, conflict, and war.  It examines the history of information 
operations and its connections to influential and successful organizations over the past 
century.  It then shows the impact the IO career field has had on shaping political, 
economic, military, and cultural forces on a long-term basis while affecting the global 
behavior of governments, organizations, and societies to support national security 
objectives. 
 Chapter III:  Relevant Theory and IO 
 Using various organization and information theories, this chapter identifies an 
organizational and informational frame of reference to determine which frame of 
reference has a greater impact on the integration of IO into combat operations.  Using the 
organizational theories of Henry Mintzberg and the work of Richard Daft as the first 
frame of reference, as well as the information theories of Claude Shannon, John Diebold, 
                                                 5 Department of the Army.  Field Manual 3-0, Operations.  June 2001.  Washington, D.C.: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008.  
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and Martin Libicki as second frame of reference, this chapter produces testable 
propositions to analyze the four case studies in Chapter IV. 
 Chapter IV:  Integrating IO in Combat 
 Using the four cases studies of Operation Joint Guard/Forge (Bosnia), Operation 
Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), Operation Enduring Freedom (Philippines), and 
Operations Iraqi Freedom (Iraq), this chapter uses the frames of reference and 
propositions developed in the chapter three to explore which frame of reference has a 
greater impact on the integration of IO into combat operations.  Organizational theory 
proposes that the organizations faced with increasingly complex environments 
decentralize, to increase the number of information processes, and to rely on support 
staffs.  Information theory further focuses on information as the message and information 
as the medium, through the physical, information, and cognitive dimensions to address 
the complex problems faced in today’s operational environment.      
 Chapter V: Findings and Recommendations 
 In order for the U.S. to become more proficient at IO, this work suggests that 
information operations should encompass the vertical and horizontal integration from 
commanders and soldiers operating within and among the populace to policy makers and 
the Secretary of Defense.  Information operations must seek to link these messages, 
presenting an integrated approach to inform U.S. forces and friendly audiences while 
influencing neutral and enemy audiences.  
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II. INFORMATION OPERATIONS BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the increased threat level throughout the world over the past decade, the 
U.S. Army and the Information Operations Career Field has had to evolve in order to 
meet the increased challenges posed by a range of adversaries.  However, according to 
many in the IO career field6 the implementation and integration of information operations 
have fallen much shorter than anticipated when prosecuting these conflicts.  This is not 
from lack of effort to utilize the elements of IO; rather, it lies in the confusion of how to 
integrate these elements from the onset to the completion of hostilities.  
The use of information operations or, at least elements of IO,7 are not new to 
warfare.  The Bible provides some of the earliest known uses of IO, when in 1300 B.C. 
Gideon utilized military deception to outwit and defeat Israel's ancient foe, the 
Midianites.  This chapter examines the historic roots of information operations broken 
down into three segments.   
The first segment highlights uses of IO at the tactical level from Gideon in 1300 
B.C. to the end of the 19th century and the Spanish American War.  The author realizes 
that this is an expansive timeframe and only highlights certain events during this period 
to illustrate the consistency of elements of IO throughout history. 
The second segment covers the early twentieth century and the strategic level of 
IO, starting with the Philippine-American war (1899-1902) until the Operation Just Cause 
in 1989, when PYSOP teams used loudspeakers to blast loud rock music and messages 
                                                 6 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions 
Report 04-13 (Fort Leavenworth: May 2004), 1–27; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Information 
Operations CAAT Initial Impressions Report 05-03 (Fort Leavenworth: May 2005), iv, 1 2, 49–52; Center 
for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Stability Operations–Support Operations Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth: December 2003), 22; OEF/OIF CAAT Initial Impressions Report: 
Stability Operations – Support Operations (Fort Leavenworth: December 2003), 61.   
7 For the purpose of this thesis IO the elements of IO are considered, Electronic Attack, Computer 
Network Operations, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Operational Security (OPSEC), Military 
Deception, Physical Destruction, Information Assurance (IA), Physical Security, Counter Intelligence, 
Counter Deception, Counter Propaganda, Civil Affairs (CA), and Public Affairs. 
 6
into the Vatican Embassy compound, where Noriega sought refuge, in an effort to 
demoralize Noriega and influence him to surrender. 
The third segment covers the Persian Gulf War in 1990 and progresses through 
the formal birth of IO in 1995 when the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) released Pamphlet 525-69, “Concept for Information Operations,”8 and ends 
with present day operations and the execution of information operations in the Global 
War on Terror.  This segment highlights the U.S. military’s attempt to integrate IO at the 
various levels of warfare. 
B. SEGMENT ONE –TACTICAL IO 
The concept of information operations formally dates from 19959 with the release 
of the Pamphlet 520-65.  However, concepts now considered essential elements of IO are 
evident throughout the history of warfare, from Gideon’s use of deception in 1300 B.C. 
to Alexander and his use of PYSOP during conquest in 356 B.C., to the current evolution 
of IO that includes a movement to five Army information tasks.10  Histories’ state leaders 
and military commanders have consistently sought to gain an advantage over their foe 
using means other than direct force of arms.  These leaders, while seeking other means, 
have always integrated their schemes into a greater overall plan of victory.   
1. Gideon and the Midianites  
One of the earliest examples of the integration of IO is Gideon’s use military 
deception in 1300 B.C.11 According to the book of Judges in the Holy Bible, Gideon, the 
leader of the Israelites, led an Army of Israelites against Israel’s ancient foe, the 
Midianites.  Facing a much larger force, Gideon utilized tactical deception to create the 
illusion of a larger military force attack at night.  Utilizing a small band of 300 soldiers, 
he divided his men into three companies, surrounded the encampment, and waited until 
                                                 8 Department of the Army, Pamphlet 525-69, Concept for Information Operations, 1995. 
9 Ibid. 
10 FM 3-0, released in 2008, updates information operations from the core supporting and related tasks 
to the five “information” tasks.  
11 Judges (chapters 6-8). 
 7
nightfall.  Just after midnight, his men blew rams' horns, broke their clay jars, and held 
blazing torches in their left hands while they shouted.12  The result was confusion among 
the army of the Midianites who fled and were ultimately defeated by a larger pursuing 
Israelite army. 
2. The Trojan War 
 The next great historical example is the Greek’s use of military deception during 
the siege of Troy.13 After ten years of failed attempts to defeat the Trojans, a Greek 
warrior devised a scheme to erect a large wooden horse as an offering to the goddess 
Athena and place it outside the gate of Troy before departing by sea.  Before departing, 
the Greek coalition warned the Trojans not to take the monument to Athena into their 
city, lest disaster would come to the city.  When the Trojans came to marvel at the Greek 
monument they found one man, Sinon, left behind to ensure the Trojans took the horse 
into Troy.  Sinon pretended to be angry with the Greeks, stating that they had deserted 
him and assured the Trojans that the wooden horse was safe and would bring luck to the 
Trojans.  That evening, when Troy was asleep or in a drunken stupor, the Greek warriors 
emerged from the horse and opened the city gate, which allowed the Greeks to slaughter 
the Trojans. 
3. Genghis Khan and the Mongol Horde  
 Perhaps one of the earliest leaders to understand the elements of IO was the 
Mongol leader Genghis Khan as he led his horsemen across Russia and Europe.  
Targeting his adversaries’ decision cycle, Khan would incorporate the use of PSYOP, 
deception, and operational security to defeat any foe he faced.  Genghis Khan’s use of IO 
before, during, and after the battle allowed his mobile army to expand their empire often 
without hostile action.  Before any attack occurred, the Khan would send scouts to ride 
ahead of his army in a two-fold mission.  The first mission was to gather intelligence on 
                                                 12 George Konig, “Gideon — Biblical People.” AboutBibleProphecy.com. 
http://www.aboutbibleprophecy.com/p16.htm (accessed November 2008). 
13 “History of the Trojan War.” Stanford University.  http://www.stanford.edu/~plomio/history.html 
(accessed November 13, 2008). 
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the area and it defenses, the second was to act as “agents of influence” by conducting 
face-to-face PSYOP with the population, telling of the brutality and large numbers in the 
Mongol army.  The agents of influence were then reinforced by the Khan’s use of 
deception to create the illusion of invincible numbers by using rapid troop maneuvers, 
making his army look larger than it really was.   
 During the battle, networks of horsemen called “arrow riders” were utilized to 
expedite battlefield communications with subordinate commanders, allowing precision 
movements and enabled the forces to mass at the decisive point.14  This enhanced 
communication coupled with the strict secrecy (OPSEC) of movements and battle plans 
along with the targeting of enemy messengers, prevented enemy commanders from 
communicating with each other, thus allowing the Mongols to achieve information 
dominance while disrupting the enemies decision cycle. 
4. Revolutionary War 
 Early examples of the use and integration of IO elements are not only evident in 
Europe but in America as well.  During the Revolutionary War, the founding fathers 
utilized military deception, PYSOP, OPSEC, and public affairs as part of the overall 
campaign to win the Revolutionary War.  Often facing superior numbers, General 
Washington used nonlethal means to his advantage, forcing the British to make wrong 
decisions tactically, operationally, and strategically. 
 The first example of the use of IO elements in America is the use of deception by 
General Washington to prevent an attack on the newly arrived French troops near 
Newport, Rhode Island.15  George Washington having received this intelligence,  
immediately drew up plans for a feinted attack on New York City.  He then had the 
“plans” delivered to a British outpost by a local farmer, who claimed to have found them 
on a nearby road.  
                                                 14 David L Grange, James A Kelley,  “Victory Through Information Dominance.” Army, March 1997,   
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/is_199703/ai_n8742077 (accessed May 2008).  
15 P. K Rose, The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence, 2008, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs/the-founding-fathers-of-american-intelligence/art-1.html (accessed May 2008) 
 9
 To convince the British of the impending attack, Washington marched his army 
toward New York City to provide further “evidence” that the Americans were preparing 
for an attack.16  The British general faced with an imminent attack and having the 
American’s attack plans, which had been signed by the American leader, recalled his 
troops that had been dispatched to attack the French to strengthen the city’s defenses.  
The timely intelligence and Washington's ruse prevented the attack on the French troops 
from apparent defeat, which in turn enabled them to reinforce the beleaguered American 
Army. 
5. American Civil War 
 During the American Civil War, each side of the conflict integrated elements of 
information operations to achieve varying levels of success in their overall strategies.  
Two primary examples are first the use of deception and electronic attack/physical 
destruction on the newly constructed telegraph system and second, the use of PSYOP and 
Public Information (later to be referred as Public Affairs).   
 With the successful deployment of the telegraph system and the demand for 
increased timely information, both Union and Confederate commanders, seeing the value 
in the telegraph system, regularly targeted the telegraph lines and its operators.  Cavalry 
units from each side would switch military telegraph traffic to the wrong destinations, 
transmit false orders, and cut the wires to deny information to the forces prior to attacks.   
 One example of this integration was the battle of Brentwood, Tennessee, when 
Confederate Brigadier General Nathan B. Forrest approached the town of Brentwood 
held by Union LTC Edward Bloodgood.  Unknown to the Union commander, the day 
prior to the attack, General Forrest had ordered his soldiers to cut the telegraph, tear up 
railroad tracks, attack the stockade, and cut off any retreat.17  The next morning a Union 
messenger from the stockade, informed the union commander that Forrest's men were 
about to attack and had destroyed railroad track.  Receiving this information, Bloodgood 
                                                 16 Rose. The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence, 2008. 
17 “Tennessee Civil War Battle Brentwood American Civil War.”  Americancivilwar.com. 
http://americancivilwar.com/statepic/tn/tn015.html (accessed November 13, 2008). 
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sought to notify his superiors and discovered that the telegraph lines were cut.  General 
Forrest sent in a demand for surrender under a flag of truce but Bloodgood refused.  
Within a half hour, the Confederate artillery began to shell Bloodgood's position as well 
as surrounded the Federals with a large force.  The union commander relented and 
decided to surrender.18  
 The second example comes from the Union side and President Lincoln’s use of 
Public Information and PSYOP while releasing the Emancipation Proclamation.  Lincoln 
used the public release of the proclamation as a strategic military measure designed to 
both deprive the Confederacy of slave labor and bring additional men into the Union 
Army.  The public release also provided tremendous inspirational and slogan value while 
declaring the Union cause as a principle based on universal justice and natural law.19   
 Lincoln delivered the proclamation, which had been previously drafted, only after 
a tactical victory by the Union.  He felt it would be inappropriate and seen as a desperate 
act versus a just and moral declaration if not released in conjunction with a Union 
victory.  His target audience was both foreign and domestic with the primary groups 
being first, the British and their support for the Union cause as they were morally 
opposed to slavery.  Second, the slaves themselves, as this provided another pool of 
recruits to fight the confederacy and reduced the labor force of the southern industry.  
Last, the proclamation targeted the white populations (both in the North and in the South) 
for their support and or opposition to slavery.  Ultimately, the timing and the content 
within the proclamation worked as it turned British support towards the Union cause, 
increased the number of black soldiers, and gave moral and inspirational encouragement 
to the slaves and white supporters alike.        
6. The Philippine Insurgency  
The last example in this general period of history occurred in the wake of the 
Spanish-American War, where the U.S. forces found themselves in a bitter guerrilla war 
facing insurgents in the former Spanish colony of the Philippines.  The guerillas fought 
                                                 18  “Tennessee Civil War Battle Brentwood American Civil War.”   
19 “Emancipation Proclamation–Abraham Lincoln and Freedom.” 
http://www.mrlincolnandfreedom.org/inside.asp?ID=39&subjectID=3 (accessed August 1, 2008).  
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with the aim of independence and improving the daily lives of Filipinos, while ensuring 
the steady stream of American casualties to weaken U.S. domestic support for the war.20   
 Faced with a growing counter insurgency, U.S. forces integrated Civil Military 
Operations and PSYOP to help defeat the Philippine rebels.  Although no leaflets of the 
time seem to have survived, evidence indicates that the Army emphasized its work in 
bringing a better life to the Filipinos.21  The Army’s use of civil military projects 
constructed and publicized farm-to-market roads, clinics, wells, and schools for the 
education-hungry people.  Using this approach, the promise of self-government and 
eventual independence, along with an effective counter insurgency campaign, ended the 
Philippine Insurrection by 1902. 
C. SEGMENT TWO – STRATEGIC IO 
1. World War I 
 The first IO related organization came to existence during the “War to End all 
Wars” (WWI) in 1917.  The Committee on Public Information (CPI), also known as the 
Creel Committee after its chief newspaperman George Creel, sought to rally U.S. public 
opinion behind WW I on behalf of the Wilson administration.22  This organization 
utilized Public Affairs, PSYOP, and OPSEC to spread it message.  Utilizing the  
expanding motion picture industry along with newspaper articles, pamphlets, and public 
speakers known as the four-minute men, the organization primarily focused on the 
American public.23   
 The success of the CPI domestically led to the later expansion of its role to 
include people and nations outside the United States.  Creel stated, “A triple task 
                                                 20 “Psychological Operations–History of US PSYOP - Part 1,” http://www.psyop.com/history1.htm 
(accessed August 1, 2008). 
21 David S. Maxwell, “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: What Would Sun Tzu Say?” Military 
Review.  FindArticles.com. November 6, 2008.  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_2004_May-June/ai_n6123958 (accessed November 10, 
2008) 
22 US Army IO Primer, U.S. Army War College, Dept. of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, 
November 2006. 
23 George Creel, “How We Advertised America, 1920,” www.Historytools.org, 
http://www.historytools.org/sources/creel.html (accessed August 8, 2008). 
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confronted us.  First, were the people of the Allied nations that required reassurance of 
the magnitude of the American effort?  This included the certainty of speedy and 
effective aid in order to relieve the war-weariness of the civilian population.  Second, we 
had to carry the truth to the neutral nations, poisoned by German lies; and third, we had 
to get the ideals of America, the determination of America, and the invincibility of 
America into the Central Powers.”24  
To accomplish the task of disseminating information, special mail and photograph 
services were built for the foreign press, reading-rooms opened abroad, schools and 
photographs were displayed prominently.25  The results of the CPI’s foreign and 
domestic work were evident at home, as the American population showed few signs of 
disloyalty or disaffection.  Liberty Loan drives were all oversubscribed and Red Cross 
contributions as well as a dozen other war-support causes were successful.  Overseas both 
of President Wilson’s trips to the war weary nations of Europe were successful.  The 
President received open adoration and praise wherever he traveled, while his Fourteen 
Points enjoyed a high-level of popularity among Europeans.26  While the CPI and its 
efforts were seen as a resounding success, many of the slogans used “the war to end war” 
and “making the world safe for democracy” were misleading catch phrases.  In reality, 
the end of the “Great War” only laid the foundation for the rise of Nazi Germany and 
fascism, followed by the Second World War27 and the creation of another IO forefather. 
2. World War II 
 When the United States entered World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
realized that public information and its policies must have the success of the defunct CPI 
                                                 24 George Creel, “How We Advertised America, 1920.” 
25 George Creel, “Creel Committee, WWI.” http://web.utk.edu/~glenn/CreelCommittee.html (accessed 
November 13, 2008). 
26 Refers to Wilson’s 14-point plan after the war. 
27 “What Role Did George Creel and the Committee on Public Information Play in the World War I?  - 
Yahoo! Answers.”  Yahoo, Inc. http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080413142143AAFx2PY 
(accessed November 13, 2008). 
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without the directed mission and the spirit of the CPI.28  Facing multiple audiences across 
the globe, the President created the Office of War Information (OWI) in 1942, focusing 
both domestically and overseas as the CPI had done.  The OWI like its predecessor, 
synchronized many of the elements of IO during the prosecution of its IO propaganda 
mission.   
 The OWI, in its establishment, consolidated several government bureaus like the 
Office of the Coordinator of Information and Foreign Intelligence Service to synchronize 
and coordinate the release of war news for domestic use.  This news was released via 
newspaper, newsreels, posters, and radio broadcast, and delivered themes that included 
the promotion of patriotism, warn about foreign spies, promote OPSEC, and attempt to 
recruit women into the wartime workforce.  The overseas branches launched large-scale 
information and propaganda campaigns against the neutral and axis populations to garner 
support for the allied cause using many of the same tactics and techniques as its domestic 
arm.    
One of the primary means of propaganda was the Voice of America (VOA), 
which began its first broadcast with the statement, “Here speaks a voice from America, 
everyday at this time we will bring you the news of the war, the news may be good, the 
news may be bad, we shall tell you the truth.”29  The radio service became so useful that, 
by the end of the war, VOA had 39 transmitters providing service in 40 languages with 
programming broadcast from production centers in New York and San Francisco and is 
still in service to this day.30     
3. Cold War 
 After the defeat of the Germans and Japanese, the spread of communism across 
the globe became the new threat to the United States.  To combat this new threat, the 
President established an organization to conduct IO at the strategic level.  The United 
                                                 28 “The Creel Committee – FREE the Creel Committee Information | Encyclopedia.Com: Find the 
Creel Committee Research.” http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3468300537.html (accessed 
November 13, 2008). 
29 “VOA News–Voice of America Homepage - News in 45 Languages.”  Broadcasting Board of 
Governors.  http://www.voanews.com/english/portal.cfm (accessed November 13, 2008). 
30 Ibid. 
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States Information Agency (USIA) was established by President Eisenhower, as 
authorized by the Smith-Mundt Act in 1953.31   The new agency included all information 
programs, to include the Voice of America (the largest constituent), which had previously 
been under the direction of the State Department.    
While no direct “large-scale” fighting took place between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, proxy wars were fought (Korea and Vietnam) along with the battle for 
public and world opinion.  The importance the USIA was evident by its director who 
reported to the President through the National Security Council.  In addition, the day-to-
day guidance on U.S. foreign policy from the Secretary of State allowed the agency to 
have up to date policy information.  
The purpose of the USIA was to utilize PSYOP and PAO in order to understand, 
inform, and influence foreign publics in the promotion of U.S. national interests.  The 
USIA accomplished this task through dialogue between Americans, U.S. institutions, and 
their counterparts abroad, as well as foster exchanges of students, professors, and diverse 
categories of citizens between the U.S. and foreign societies.32  This mission allowed the 
United States to promote America and its policies by having the populations of the world 
experience the United States firsthand, as U.S. citizens went abroad on cultural and 
educational exchanges with their American spirit.  This surviving program of cultural 
exchange was and still is very effective, as many of the today’s world leaders have taken 
part in these exchanges. 
4. Operation Just Cause 
 The last example during this segment is Operation Just Cause in 1989, when the 
United States integrated the use of PYSOP, civil affairs, and public affairs teams 
throughout the entire process of the operation.  PSYOP teams prepared the population 
                                                 31 Bryan Hill, “The Smith–Mundt Act of 1948: Comments, Critiques, and the Way Forward.”  The 
Center for Security Policy. 
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/Modules/NewsManager/Center%20publication%20PDFs/OCC%20
Smith%20Mundt.pdf (accessed November 13, 2008). 
32 “USIA, the United States Information Agency Homepage.”  Federal Depository Library at the 
University of Illinois at Chicago. http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/ (accessed October 13, 2008). 
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months in advance by using pre-recorded messages and scripts on the radio and 
television33 as political tension increased between the two nations.   
 Public affairs and PYSOP teams collaborated to explain the current American 
actions in Panama to two different audiences.  The first audience, the American people, 
received an explanation for the U.S. intervention from President Bush.  The second 
audience, the local Panamanian population, received information on the intent of U.S. 
forces in Panama with the purpose gaining their support.  The U.S. accomplished this 
through the production and dissemination of one million leaflets and handbills, 50,000 
posters, 550,000 newspapers, and 125,000 units of other miscellaneous printed materials 
coupled with television broadcasts and radio stations operating 24 hours a day to inform 
the local populace.34  
On the day of the invasion, PSYOP teams landed with the assault force to conduct 
tactical PSYOP operations during the initial phase of the invasion.  These initial teams 
were later relieved by various civil affairs and psychological elements that arrived to 
relieve the assault forces, engage in stability operations, and help establish a new 
government.35  While many different techniques were used during the operations, tactical 
PSYOP teams are ultimately remembered for the use of tactical loudspeakers to blast 
rock music and messages into the Vatican Embassy compound in an effort to demoralize 
Noriega and influence him to surrender.  The important point from this operation is the 
fact that commanders integrated the elements of IO into the planning process from the 
beginning to end.  This foresight by commanders set the stage for future conflicts and the 
important role of the future IO career field.  
D. SEGMENT THREE – ATTEMPTS AT INTEGRATING IO  
The dawning of the information age brought with it a shift from the traditional 
command and control warfare to a new concept called information operations.  While the 
                                                 33 Ed Rouse, “Panama - Operation just Cause.” http://www.psywarrior.com/panama.html (accessed 




creation of the information operations theory would not officially arrive until 1995, many 
of the elements of IO were evident during the first Gulf War (1990), when the U.S. 
military acknowledged the importance and relevance of information during combat 
operations by integrating command and control warfare (C2W).  While the new C2W 
(IO) warriors were few in number, the importance of the field along with the 
development and progression of new information theories began to evolve.   
1. Operation Desert Shield/ Storm 
In Operation Desert Shield and subsequent Desert Storm, commanders prosecuted 
Command and Control warfare almost perfectly with at least, five elements of IO 
(Deception, PSYOP, OPSEC, EW, and Physical Destruction) which integrated into the 
overall campaign plan.  The plan integrated the aforementioned five elements of IO into 
plans at both the strategic and operational levels.  Coalition forces systematically 
inundated Iraqi troops with psychological operations (PSYOP) products; decimated 
Iraq’s air defense system; disrupted its ability to acquire targets; reduced its ability to 
conduct propaganda operations; and interrupted communications between military 
commanders from the strategic to the tactical level.  Further supported by a robust 
military deception (largest since World War II), these actions rendered Iraq’s military 
forces ineffective, mentally defeated, and subsequently defeated by persistent bombing 
runs coupled with a blitzkrieg ground campaign of the coalition forces.  The full 
spectrum integration of command and control warfare was impressive and laid  
the groundwork for future battlefield successes.   
The resounding images of the Iraqi military surrendering en masse remains as 
clear today as they did in 1990, and serves as a testament to the power of information 
when coupled with military action.  However, as powerful as the images are, the 
integration of IO remained at the strategic level and to some degree at the operational 
level.  The deliberate use of many of the elements of IO were used with great success but 
ultimately few commanders at the operational level and below fully appreciated and 
utilized command and control warfare. 
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2. Somalia – Operation Restore Hope 
With a resounding success using C2W (IO) in Desert Storm, the next test came 
during the U.S. operations in the country of Somalia in 1992.  Although the military had 
not produced a doctrine to guide the organization, U.S. commanders used many of the 
now stated IO capabilities during the humanitarian mission.  Commanders began using 
“soft power” by utilizing a combination of PSYOP and public affairs along with CA 
teams to pass selected themes and messages to the Somali people and leaders.  The CA 
and PSYOP teams’ management of relief projects eased the immense Somali human 
suffering and reinforced the U.S. military themes and messages.36  Essentially, the 
humanitarian crisis was relieved during the initial days of the mission.  This use of 
tactical level IO coupled with the strategic level showed another attempt by commanders 
to utilize the power of information during an operation.  Tactical PSYOP and CA teams 
conducted face-to-face engagements at the tactical level while public affairs officers and 
media beamed images of U.S. humanitarian relief across the world. 
In March 1993, the UN and subsequently the Clinton administration prompted the 
U.S. military to change its humanitarian mission to a peace enforcement/nation building 
mission, which resulted in the turning point for military forces in the area.  This change 
of mission involved attempts to implement disarmament of the fifteen Somali parties 
(specifically General Mohammed Farrah Aidid’s) who had signed a reconciliation plan in 
March of 1993.  These attempts resulted in hostile engagements between UN/U.S. and 
the Somali forces.  The increase in hostilities between the U.S. and Somalis militias 
destroyed the credibility and neutrality of the U.S. among the suffering Somali people.  It 
is important to note that during this period, an important lesson was learned by the 
evolving IO field.  This lesson came from our adversary (Mohammed Farah Aidid) rather 
than the U.S. itself.  Aidid, who considered himself a master of perception management, 
had his forces film themselves dragging the dead body of a U.S. pilot through the streets 
of Mogadishu and then passed the video to the international news media.37  The footage 
                                                 36 Zachary P. Hubbard, “Operations in the Information Age:  A USAF Perspective,” Abstract. 
37 During operations to capture tier-one personalities of the Habr Gidr clan, headed by Aidid, two U.S. 
MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by rocket-propelled grenades, and three others damaged. 
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ran across the globe and resulted in the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia as well as 
a reversal of U.S. national policy in the Horn of Africa.   
The lessons learned from operations in Somalia were first, that when information 
is properly applied it could be just as powerful as military, economic, and diplomatic 
power.  The second lesson was the power of the “CNN factor” and how it can be used to 
impact combat operations with second and third order effects. 38  The last lesson was how 
tactical level events can have operational and strategic impact.     
3. Haiti – Uphold Democracy 
In 1994, U.S. commanders extensively used command and control warfare (IO) 
elements prior to U.S. forces entering Haiti for Operation Uphold Democracy.  Although 
contingency plans for both permissive and forcible entry plans were in place, IO 
components were in full swing with PSYOP, Civil Affairs, and Public Affairs used 
heavily to get a permissible entry.  Senior military and government leaders showed their 
new understanding of information by the integrated use of the elements of IO before, 
during, and after the operations.  While the primary effort was at the strategic level, 
glimpses of IO at the operational and tactical level are evident as well.      
At the strategic level, military commanders used elements of IO prior to the 
introduction of forces by having military aircraft broadcast PSYOP messages directly to 
the Haitian people through radio and TV.  The messages ranged from discouraging the 
Haitians from attempting to flee to the United States, to messages from deposed President 
Aristide explaining the situation and the mission of U.S. soldiers.  To encourage Haitians 
to listen to broadcasts, the U.S. military dropped 10,000 portable radios which allowed 
citizens to monitor the Commando Solo broadcasts by the 193 Special Operations Group, 
Pennsylvania Air National Guard.39  
At the operational level, influence operations targeted Haitian military leaders and 
top civilian leaders.  U.S. messages urged the Haitian civilian and military leadership to 
                                                 38 The CNN Factor is considered the power of the press to have direct impact on a government’s 
foreign policy.  Its effects are hotly debated. 
39 “PSYOP in Haiti,” http://www.psywarrior.com/haiti2.html (accessed May 28, 2008). 
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relinquish power, to capitulate to American troops, and to turn in their weapons.  This 
countrywide campaign aided by the U.S. helped transition back to the democratically 
elected Haitian government. 
At the tactical level, commanders integrated C2W by utilized their Tactical 
PSYOP Teams (TPT) with outstanding success.  One such integration was when a 
“tactical commander decided to use a graduated response tactic that began with TPTs 
broadcasting surrender messages, followed by a countdown sequence.  Approximately 
80% of the individuals at each objective surrendered and the rest offered no resistance 
when the assault team entered the building.  Not a shot was fired during the entire 
operation.  Again, a well planned and well executed IO at the tactical level, in direct 
support of the commander’s mission and intent, was invaluable to the successful and safe 
accomplishment of the mission.”40   
4. Bosnia – Operation Provide Promise 
Over the next six years (1994-2000), several significant events occurred to the 
information operation field.  The first was the creation of  the Army’s first and only IO 
unit, 1st Information Operations Command (Land), formerly the Land Information 
Warfare Activity was activated in 1995.41  Additionally, the first Army IO doctrine (FM 
100-6) was published in 1996, with the first Joint IO doctrine followed in 1998, and most 
importantly in 1997, when the Army created a functional area for IO officers under the 
Officer Personnel Management System XXI (OPMS XXI) in 1997.42  The first large-
scale application and integration of IO (as a U.S. military doctrine) was in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Operations in Bosnia revealed the value of integrating and coordinating the 
newly minted concept of IO with combat operations.  IO professionals began working 
from the tactical to the strategic levels with the MND (N) IO cell being the staff agency 
responsible for planning, coordinating, and synchronizing IO at the division level 
(operational/tactical).  The IO cell was structured around the 3rd Infantry Division 
                                                 40  “U.S. PSYOP in Haiti - Operation Uphold Democracy,” http://www.psywarrior.com/HerbHaiti.html 
(accessed May 18, 2008).  
41 Land Information Warfare Activity (Fort Belvoir, VA: Land Information Warfare Activity, 1998), 1. 
42 OPMS XXI Study Final Report, July 9, 1997. 
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(Mechanized) fire support element43 (FSE) (-) where a lieutenant colonel served as the 
chief of IO.  This cell included current operations, plans, special projects/targeting, and 
intelligence sections.44  
To augment the emerging importance of information operations planning, a Field 
Support Team (FST) from the Army’s then new IO center of excellence, the Land 
Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), based in Fort Belvoir, Virginia, arrived to help 
commanders plan and integrate IO.45  It is important to note that this is first instance of 
the military establishment specifically structuring to support the application of IO in 
operations.  IO, professionals were found at the division and higher levels with a varied 
histories and background.      
Perhaps the most important lesson learned was the integrated utility of PA, CA, 
and PSYOP as non-lethal weapons across the multiple levels of warfare.  Civil affairs, 
like previous conflicts, played a tremendous role in Bosnia at the tactical and operational 
levels.  CA soldiers coordinated humanitarian relief efforts and assisted in the 
establishment of government functions and services in the newly formed Bosnian 
government.  PSYOP and PAO troops conducted a massive public information campaign 
at the operational level in an effort to prevent former warring factions from returning to 
hostilities, while key leaders utilized face-to-face engagements with the former warring 
factions’ leaders in order to gauge levels of commitment and influence.  This 
multifaceted use of the channels of information to reach to different target audiences had 
a profound impact on the abilities of the Serbs, Bosnians, and the Croatians and can be 
attributed to the success enjoyed by coalition forces in Bosnia. 
                                                 43Captain Timothy D. LaBahn, “Information Operations in Bosnia.”  FA Journal.  FindArticles.com. 
November 13, 2008.  http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAU/is_6_6/ai_81626115 
44Ibid. 
45 Lieutenant Colonel Stephen W. Shanahan, US Army, Retired, and Lieutenant Colonel Garry J. 
Beavers, U.S. Army,  “Information Operations in Bosnia,” Military Review, Vol. LXXVII, No. 6, 56; U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.   
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5. Kosovo – Operation Allied Force 
In the Kosovo campaign, information operations engaged in one of the first 
known network wars, along with an active information war.  The Serbs conducted 
network attacks on NATO computer systems, attacked web pages, and sent over 2000 
emails containing viruses.  The Serbs also employed the old Soviet art of “maskirova,” or 
tactical deception with great success in Kosovo.  Aviation Week and Space Technology in 
July 1999 reported that NATO had dropped 3,000 precision-guided munitions, had hit 
500 decoys, but had only destroyed 50 tanks.46   
On the NATO/U.S. side Admiral James Ellis, the Commander of Allied Force and 
JTF Noble Anvil describes IO as, “at once a great success…and perhaps the greatest 
failure of the war.”47 The Kosovo campaign cites many IO successes, including the 
development of the first IO cell at the Joint Task force level, the successful use of 
PSYOP, and the creation of the Balkan Information Exchange, a EUCOM sponsored 
website established to provide unbiased news reporting on the Balkans region.  The 
website offered Balkan news in nine regional languages and still exists under EUCOM 
sponsorship as the Southeast European Times.  The downside of the IO campaign was 
exemplified when Admiral Ellis warned of the perils of information saturation and staffs 
being controlled by information rather than vice versa.  He stated that there were 
numerous missed IO opportunities, an overall lack of IO understanding by warfighters, 
and a resounding defeat in the public affairs “battle.”  It is clear that today’s threat (Bin 
Laden and the Al Qaeda network) learned from these shortfalls of the Information War in 
Kosovo, when Bin Laden and the newly formed “World Islamic Front” declared jihad 
against Jews & Crusaders in February 1998 trying to capitalize on the “media effect” it 
had observed. 48   
                                                 46 David A. Fulghum, “Pentagon Dissecting Kosovo Combat Data,” Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, July 26, 1999, 68. 
47 Admiral James K. Ellis, “A View from the Top,” http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/ppt/ellis_kosovo_aar.ppt, 
(accessed May 24, 2008). 
48 Lawrence, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden. 
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More importantly, the problems identified in Kosovo showed the beginnings of 
problems that would be exacerbated in the Global War on Terrorism and by the Al Qaeda 
terrorist network.  Although there is no direct evidence to support this claim, the AQ 
network learned from these shortfalls and was even emboldened by the responses of the 
United States in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.  This is further evident when Al Qaeda 
planned and conducted a series of attacks leading up to September 11, 2001. 
6. Global War on Terror (Al Qaeda and OEF) 
In 1998, AQ conducted attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania, resulting in the death of 200 people with more than 5,000 injured, 
however, the U.S. response was minimal.  In December 1999 and into 2000, Al Qaeda 
planned attacks against U.S. and Israeli tourists during millennial celebrations; however, 
Jordanian authorities thwarted the planned attacks and put 28 suspects on trial.49  The 
plot included bombing LAX but was thwarted when AQ member, Ahmed Ressam was 
caught at the U.S./Canadian border with explosives in the trunk of his car.  Al Qaeda also 
planned to attack the USS The Sullivans on January 3, 2000, but the effort failed due to 
too much weight from the explosives, which sank the attacking boat.  An additional 
attack was the successful bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000.50 Although the 
attack received tremendous media attention, the U.S. response was minimal.  While many 
of the attacks were foiled, the media attention of the planned attacks expanded the ever-
growing confidence of Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden.  The impact of the terrorist 
organization on the information operations field to this point had been relatively small, 
however, information operation evolved more from the changing dynamics of warfare 
rather than from the effects of the terrorists.  This was about to change with the Global 
War on Terrorism. 
                                                 49 Howard Schneider, “Jordan Condemns 6 to Death for Plot; Terror Plan Targeted Millennium 
Tourists.” The Washington Post, 2000. 
50 Chris Plante, Terry Fieden and Nancy Peckenham, “Yemeni President Calls USS Cole Attack ‘Very 
Well-Planned,’” www.cnn.com, http://edition.cnn.com/2000/US/10/18/cole.investigation/index.html 
(accessed June 4, 2008). 
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After the shock of the September 11 attacks, the government and the military 
sought to bring to bear the full power of the U.S. against the Al Qaeda network, who to 
this point, had been considered a nominal threat.  Information operations elements 
incorporated directly into the plan, assisted with the seizure of Al Qaeda assets and 
electronically tracked the flow of money to interrupt their supply network.  As CNO 
assets worked to disrupt the flow of money, a synchronized media barrage, which 
promised U.S. retribution, stated, “The United States of America will use all our 
resources to conquer this enemy.  We will rally the world.  We will be patient.  We will 
be focused, and we will be steadfast in our determination.  This battle will take time and 
resolve, but make no mistake about it, we will win.”51  Although “soft power” was used 
in the early stages of the War on Terrorism, direct hostile engagement would soon follow 
along with numerous other supporting elements of information operations.  It was during 
this hostile engagement in Afghanistan that military officials realized that the Al Qaeda 
network was more sophisticated than originally thought.  A sophisticated enemy that uses 
the Internet, encrypts communications to plan, command and controls its operations, and 
has a sophisticated financial network backing it.52 
Al Qaeda’s media machine had yet to go into full production, yet it began using 
statements like Bin Laden’s response to the September 11th attacks, when he stated, “On 
the blessed Tuesday 11 September, 2001 … they launched their attacks with their planes 
in an unparalleled and magnificent feat of valor, unmatched by any in humankind before 
them.  …  Yet with the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York, there occurred an 
even bigger destruction: that of the great American Dream and legend of Democracy.”  
(Translation of Purported Bin Laden Audio Message, Posted on Islamist Site, 2/14/03)53 
and “It Is Very Easy to Target [America's] Flimsy Base And … We Will Be Able Crush 
                                                 51 “Online News Hour: Bush Speech–September 12, 2001,” 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/terroristattack/bush_speech_9-12.html (accessed June 5, 2008). 
52 Timothy L. Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet:  The Danger of ‘Cyberplanning’,” Parameters, 
Spring 2003, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 
http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/ISSUES/alqaedainternet.HTM  (accessed March 19, 2003).   
53 White House Press Secretary, “In their Own Words: What the Terrorists Believe, what they Hope to 
Accomplish, and how they Intend to Accomplish it,” White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060905-7.html (accessed June 5, 2008).  
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And Destroy Them.”54 The use of Al Jazeera as a medium to deliver messages, along 
with extensive use of the Internet, allowed Al Qaeda to launch salvo after salvo of 
propaganda at the United States and the international community.  These messages often 
went unanswered by the U.S. government, the military, and the IO community on the 
national level.  Military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, operating at the operational 
and tactical levels, relied on their IO officers to counter these messages; this was 
accomplished through extensive use of public affairs messages, PSYOP leaflets, 
broadcasts, and civil affairs engagements with the indigenous population.   
The Afghan and Iraqi population, while being addressed through the same 
mediums (PSYOP, PAO, Civil Affairs) where not responding due to the Al Jazeera news 
service providing contradictory broadcasts which depicted scenes of dead and captured 
American and British soldiers, airing audio messages from Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin 
Laden, and other Al Qaeda members.  The use of the influential Qatar-based Al Jazeera, 
(called the “Arab CNN,” by various members of Al Qaeda) cannot be overstated.  The Al 
Jazeera network beams its message across the Middle East (and now the world) to a 
reported 35 to 40 million viewers.55 Al Qaeda’s use of this venue, along with many 
western media sources (BBC, CNN, and Fox News) in an unwitting manner, has caused 
military and civilian leaders alike to fall far behind in the battle of the story.56  Although 
strategically the U.S. was falling behind, the information operations communities at the 
tactical and operational levels were competing on an equal pace with the terrorist 
messages.57  
To remedy the drastic shortfall at the strategic level, then Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, announced the development of the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) 
October 30, 2001.  The office was formed with the intention of providing “direct, 
                                                 54 White House Press Secretary, “In their Own Words: What the Terrorists Believe, what they Hope to 
Accomplish, and how they Intend to Accomplish it.” 
55 “Online News Hour: Window on the War October 8, 2001,” 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/july-dec01/jazeera_10-8.html (accessed June 6, 2008). 
56 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “DefenseLink Speech:” 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199 (accessed June 6, 2008). 
57 Author’s personal experience with this in during deployment to OIF 05-06. 
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unfettered access to global information to contested areas,”58 but was accused of 
conducting “black propaganda”59 (i.e., disinformation) in foreign media.60  This stirred 
up controversy and some feared that even hinting at black propaganda would ruin the 
U.S. military’s credibility.  When media picked up information about the supposed 
“Black propaganda,” the OSI was dismantled striking another blow to the IO community, 
although former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has suggested that its programs remain 
essentially intact.61  This ill-fated venture to remedy the shortfall of a strategic IO 
campaign was sadly ended by the Pentagon’s public affairs staff, rather than any terrorist 
network.  However, the result on the information operation field was the same.   
What was becoming even more apparent in the struggle with terrorism was the 
fact that military commanders at all levels were becoming more reliant on their IO officer 
and the synchronized IO campaigns.  However, the critical shortage of qualified officers 
in the U.S. military inventory left military commanders using proxies with no experience 
to conduct information operations in combat.  The use of untrained personnel led to the 
misuse of the term IO, as all things nonlethal and the belief that IO was some kind of 
magic bullet to help commanders achieve objectives.  Commanders came to believe that 
IO officers, who tried to synchronize the oddball collection of military capabilities, did 
not require resources or emphasis from the commander to accomplish the mission.62  
This however was wrong, as the IO community identified four trends after the first 
                                                 58 “How the Rocket Scientists got Into the Hearts-and-Minds Game - US News and World Report,” US 
News & World Report, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050425/25roots.b1.htm (accessed 
June 5, 2008).  
59 While U.S. law states that the military may not place “black propaganda” in U.S. media, but it is not 
prohibited from doing so in foreign media, including in allied countries 
60 Tom Carver, “BBC News | AMERICAS | Pentagon Plans Propaganda War,” BBC News 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1830500.stm (accessed June 5, 2008). 
61 Donald Rumsfeld, “Secretary Rumsfeld on DARPA's Total Information Awareness,” 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2002/11/dod111802.html (accessed June 6, 2008). 
62 The core elements of information operations are considered as; electronic warfare, computer network 
operations, psychological operations, military deception and operations security. 
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couple of years of the War on Terror63.  First, Army Doctrine was not adequate to 
provide guidance for shaping the information environment in full spectrum operations at 
all Army echelons.  Second, Intelligence support to IO was inadequate.  Third, units 
lacked the resources to integrate IO into their operations.  Lastly, commanders, staffs and 
IO officers did not understand how to integrate IO with all the tools (Civil Affairs, Public 
Affairs, maneuver, fire support, logistics, etc.) available to them to shape the information 
environment in which they would operate.64  These trends led to Army leaders calling for 
another revision in the Army’s capstone doctrine FM 3-0 as well as the doctrine guiding 
information operations FM 3-13.   
These comments, along with a constant volley of information attacks, by Al 
Qaeda central and terrorist groups in the theaters of operation, led senior officials like 
Secretary Rumsfeld to state, “Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in 
today's media age, but for the most part we — our country, our government — has not 
adapted”65, and “the al Qaeda terrorist network and other “extremist” movements “have 
successfully . . . poisoned the Muslim public's view of the West.”66  This prompted 
Secretary Rumsfeld to publish the information operations roadmap that defined the U.S. 
military's approach to information warfare, with an emphasis on the Internet, followed by 
an updated version of FM 3-13, the Army’s doctrine for IO.  While this updated 
information strategy set forth guidelines from the strategic level it did little to remedy the 
confusion among commanders and practitioners.  
                                                 63 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions 
Report 04-13(Fort Leavenworth: May 2004), 1–27; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Information 
Operations CAAT Initial Impressions Report 05-03 (Fort Leavenworth: May 2005), iv, 1–2, 49–52;Center 
for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Stability Operations–Support Operations Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth: December 2003), 22; OEF/OIF CAAT Initial Impressions Report: 
Stability Operations – Support Operations (Fort Leavenworth: December 2003), 61.   
64 Ibid.   
65 Amy Westfeldt, “Rumsfeld Says Extremists Winning Media War,” San Francisco Chronicle, sec. 
2008, Friday, February 17, 2006 (accessed June 6, 2008). 
66 Ann Scott Tyson, “Rumsfeld Urges using Media to Fight Terror,” The Washington Post, sec. 2008, 
Saturday, February 18, 2006 (accessed June 6, 2008). 
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7. Global War on Terrorism (Operation Iraqi Freedom) 
During OIF and OEF (2003 and on) commanders and IO practitioners alike, used 
their own experience and bias to define how IO should be incorporated into combat 
operations.  While some units achieved success, others saw minimal results, because they 
did not believe in IO, or the personnel running the programs were inexperienced.67  
Because commanders struggled with IO, they each developed their own methods to 
integrate IO into combat operations68.  Most failures integrating IO were the result of the 
commander failing to visualize the complete operational environment and the IO officer 
failing to assist the commander.  As a result, IO was viewed in terms of good news 
(inform), rather than change the perceptions of the target audiences.  This led senior 
leaders to call for another visit to doctrine to redefine IO and its use.  
The revisionism of current Army doctrinal manuals continues to cause confusion 
within the Army and the IO community, and has had a cascading effect on the military 
institutions.  Because current doctrine is inadequate, training programs based on doctrine 
are not adequately preparing commanders or their staffs for the task of integrating IO into 
operations.  In addition, IO practitioners are not being trained to understand and explain 
what IO is and how to integrate it.  The last update of FM 3-0 (2008) does a better job of 
integrating IO into operations, however, it does little to outline what the new 
“information” is and how commanders are to use it.  Authors of the doctrine state that the 
new FM 3-13 (currently under revision) will define what IO is and how commanders are 
to use it.  
The rewrite of FM 3-13 has caused a firestorm among leaders within the Army as 
well as within the IO community itself.  While IO warriors continue to wage the battle on 
the terrorists throughout the world, there is a battle going on within the Army to redefine 
IO and how utilize it.  Two schools of thought have divided the IO community on the 
                                                 67 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions 
Report 04-13(Fort Leavenworth: May 2004), 1 - 27; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Information 
Operations CAAT Initial Impressions Report 05-03 (Fort Leavenworth: May 2005), iv, 1 – 2, 49– 
52;Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Stability Operations–Support Operations 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth: December 2003), 22; OEF/OIF CAAT Initial Impressions 
Report: Stability Operations – Support Operations (Fort Leavenworth: December 2003), 61 
68 Ibid. 
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strategic vision of IO.  The first believes that operations should be conceived in terms of 
affecting human will and decision making as their ultimate purpose.69  The second view 
asserts there is a qualitative and categorical difference between combat operations and 
“information operations.”  It contends operations are focused on operational objectives, 
which are derived directly from the assigned mission and which may or may not be 
“cognitive.”70  This division among IO professionals has led to a division among the 
senior leadership as well, as both schools of thought have sought to gather support from 
general officers at varying levels.  To date this internal fight has yet to cause disruption 
among the operations being conducted within the theaters of operation.  However, it is 
evident that the terrorists’ ability to conduct unimpeded operations, in many of the 
information domains, along with cognitive effects on local populations has caused 
confusion within the U.S. military.  This is evident by both military and civilian leaders 
pressuring information operators to speed the evolution of the field, to counter and 
ultimately defeat Al Qaeda and associated groups.  This in turn has led to the division 
mentioned above and a rivalry between those in the IO field, and senior army officers 
solicited by each side.  The transition to the five Army information tasks, from the core 
supporting and related activities, in chapter 7 of the 2008 version of FM 3-0 has only 
exacerbated this division.   
                                                 69 United States Army Information Operations Proponent.  Information and Cyberspace Symposium, 
2008.  Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Information Operations Proponent, 2008  
70 Ibid. 
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III. RELEVANT THEORIES AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Looking through two frames of reference (organizational and informational), this 
thesis explores which frame of reference has a greater ability to explain the level of 
integration of IO into combat operations.  Using organizational theory as the first frame 
of reference, this thesis outlines how organizations operate in the spectrum of simple to 
complex and stable to unstable environments military commanders face in the operational 
environment.  
The second frame of reference uses information theory as presented by authors 
such as Claude Shannon, John Diebold, and Martin Libicki.  This thesis examines 
whether external forces and the need to address them through the physical, cognitive and 
informational dimensions, influences the integration of IO.   
Finally, this chapter develops a framework to analyze four case studies and the 
ability of military organizations in the cases to integrate information operations into 
combat operations; the framework uses propositions based on the two frames of reference 
(organizational and informational) discussed during the chapter.  
B. ORGANIZATIONAL FRAME OF REFERENCE 
The first frame of reference addresses the organization, its structure, and 
environmental uncertainty.  Organizational leaders look to direct, or pattern, the activities 
of a group of people or staff members toward a common outcome (goals).  The 
achievement and effectiveness of the common goals is greatly affected by how this 
pattern is designed and implemented.  Patterns of activity that are complementary and 
interdependent are more likely to result in the achievement of intended outcomes.     
From a rational, structural perspective, organizational design begins with the 
creation of a strategy, or a set of guidelines, by which members choose appropriate 
actions.  To organize, institutions connect people with each other in meaningful and 
purposeful ways.  Organizational structure defines the formal relationships among people 
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and specifies both their roles and their responsibilities using guidelines, procedures, 
policies, doctrine, and special instructions while administrative systems govern the 
organization.  Each element should support each other and together, they must support 
the organization’s purpose.  
1. Organizational Structure  
Every organization has a starting point and faces varying degrees of complexity 
and uncertainty as the business grows.  How an organization is structured can help 
minimize the environmental uncertainty (complexity) and reduce the impact on the 
efficiency of the organization.  Using a scale from the simple to complex (Figure 1), 
Mintzberg places organizations in one of four types Machine, Simple, Professional, 
Adhocracy based on the level of uncertainty in the environment.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Organizations faced with complexity  
 
The first side of the scale is the simple domain where environmental factors are 
certain and organizations have a centralized control.  Common characteristics of 
organizations in the simple domain tend to have a narrow specialization of jobs, a  
large operating core, require a minimal amount of skill, and have little training  
for the operating base.  Within the simple domain, two organizations exist, the  
machine bureaucracy and simple structure.71 
                                                 71 Henry Mintzberg, Structures in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1993). 
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The first organization is what Mintzberg refers to as the simple structure.  This 
organization has few leaders or top managers and a core group of personnel completing 
the basic work (much like the Army hierarchical structure).  Decision-making is likewise 
flexible, with the centralization of power allowing for allowing for quick response.  
Strategic vision falls solely on the chief executive and tends to be highly intuitive, often 
thriving on uncertainty and oriented to the aggressive search for opportunities.  This type 
of organization has few specialized or formalized procedures and makes minimal use of 
planning, training, and the liaison devices.  It is, above all, organic.  The downfall of this 
organization is due to aging and growth of the company.  Simple structures are often 
young and small, allowing for rapid changes within the environment they operate.  As 
organizations expand, the need to develop SOP’s and formalize procedures reduces the 
fluidity of the organization.   
The second organization discussed in the simple environment is the machine 
bureaucracy.  This organization is where outside factors have a low impact and 
organizations develop standard operating procedure (SOP’s).72  These SOP’s ensure that 
individuals or subordinate units who are empowered to do so, complete tasks and work.  
This empowerment leads to institutionalization when subordinates and staff elements 
within the organization take ownership of the SOPs.  This type of organization is efficient 
and produces reliable outcomes for the organization with the tendency to integrate 
vertically.  This vertical integration means that the hierarchy has all the formal power 
concentrated at the top, with a substantial group of mid level managers to reduce 
uncertainty and to handle the standardized process of work.  Organizations of this type 
emphasis standardization of work for coordination which results in highly specialized 
jobs capable of mass production with speed and efficiency. 
The second side of the scale is the complex domain where environmental factors 
are uncertain and organizations tend to have decentralized control.  Common 
characteristics of organizations in the complex domain tend to have a wide variety of  
 
                                                 72 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit,” Harvard Business Review, 1981, 7. 
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specialized jobs, high numbers of liaison devices, and require a high amount of skill and 
training for the operating core.  Within the complex domain, two organizations exist, the 
professional bureaucracy and adhocracy73.   
The first organization in the complex domain is the professional bureaucracy.  
This organization relies on the standardization skills rather than output.  The key 
component of this organization is the operating core, which is highly trained, educated, 
and given a high degree of autonomy.  According to Mintzberg, these organizations have 
a wide span of control with moderately large staffs, but have weak vertical and horizontal 
integration.74  As the complexity increases, the organization must adjust to compensate in 
order to retain its proficiency by decentralizing power to a professional work force 
responsible for handling the workload with technical systems that are simple and non-
regulating.75 
The second organization discussed in the complex domain is the adhocracy.  This 
organization relies on a decentralized control allowing skilled “organic” managers and 
multidisciplinary teams to control operations.  When faced with surprise, uncertainty, and 
complexity the leadership in this type of organization will be overwhelmed with the 
volume of information and will require an increase in the number of information 
processes to understand the environment.  This increase requires professional teams of 
leaders or operators with more autonomy, these teams empowered by senior leaders are 
required to assist as complexity increases.  This fusion of experts, drawn from different 
specialties, allows smooth functioning, creative teams to attain strategic goals.76  
Adhocracy coordinates primarily by mutual adjustment among all of its parts, calling 
especially for the collaboration of its support staff.  Jobs are specialized, involving 
extensive training but little formalization, liaison devices are used extensively, and the 
structure is decentralized selectively in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions. 





In a complex environment, the organization’s performance is dependent upon the 
execution of facilitative and operational efforts.  The traditional theory of organizational 
interdependence addresses the extent to which departments or staffs depend on each other 
for resources or materials to accomplish their tasks, much as military commanders 
depend on other subordinate commanders and staff within the organization to execute 
their orders.77  Therefore, the management of interdependence is a critical aspect of 
performance in organizations in complex environments.   
The need to manage interdependence through facilitative effort has led to the 
emergence of informal relationships in complex organizations.  Informal organization 
serves the purpose of coordinating interdependent elements within the organization.  
Given the nature of interdependence and the informal mechanisms that seek to manage it, 
exchanges between commanders and subordinates within the organization acquire a 
social rather than a work related characteristic.  Social exchanges avoid the explicit and 
center on the implicit contracts, leaving future obligations relatively ambiguous.  This 
open-ended form of reciprocity enables staff and subordinates to have a stake in informal 
relationships.  Allowing recurrent transactions to establish a stable pattern of cooperation 
emerges between interdependent commanders, staffs, and subordinates.  These issues 
suggest that it is more useful to view an organization as a network of interdependent roles 
rather than as a nexus of contracts.78 
2. Environmental Uncertainty 
Every organization has to deal with situations where little information about the 
environment, which is in a state of flux and is largely unpredictable, is available.  Known 
as uncertainty, leaders seek to reduce the unknown by taking various measures to ensure 
organizations maintain efficiency and productivity.  According Jay Galbratih “The  
 
                                                 77 Theory by Interdependence by James Thompson as presented by Richard L. Daft, Organizational 
Theory and Design, 6th ed., (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College Publishing, 1998), 138. 
78 V. Nilakant, “Agency Theory and Uncertainty in Organizations: An Evaluation.”  CNET Networks, 
Inc.  http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4339/is_n 5_v15/ai_16548966/pg_14 (accessed October 13, 
2008).  
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greater the uncertainty of the task, the greater the amount of information that has to be 
processed between decision makers during the execution of the task to get a given level 
of performance.”79   
The literature on environmental uncertainty can be organized into two categories: 
contingency views and perceptual views.  Contingency views are concerned with reading 
the environment and fitting the organization to its reality.  Uncertainty (and implicitly 
environmental uncertainty) was a major determinant of the amount of information 
processing needed to achieve a given level of performance.  The perceptual views of 
environmental uncertainty are process oriented, in that they seek to describe the stages 
involved in noticing, interpreting, or learning the environment in order to reach closure to 
its meaning.80  Environmental uncertainty is not only an external force but also be viewed 
internally as well.      
Uncertainty can be viewed as due primarily to complexity and instability from 
outside the organization.  The larger organization surrounding the execution of operations 
is complex due to the varying number and divergence of the subordinate organizations 
and unstable due to the instability of doctrinal tasks.  The absence of policy and guidance, 
as well as the absence of clear outlined goals while developing and waging a strategy, has 
the potential to underscore the ability of organizations to operate in an effective and 
synergistic manner.  The two primary ways the environment influences organizations is 
through the need for information and resources from the environment.81  The lack of 
information or resources increases the level of uncertainty within the organization.  
Daft’s observation considers organizational uncertainty as a product of available or 
unavailable external environmental information and resources.   
                                                 79 Jay Galbraith, “Organization Design: An Information Processing View.” Interfaces, Vol 4, Number, 
May 1974. 
80 Edwin A. Gerloff, “Three components of perceived environmental uncertainty: an exploratory 
analysis of the effects of aggregation.”  Journal of Management.  FindArticles.com.  December 5, 2008.  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4256/is_n4_v17/ai_11817389 (accessed November 5, 2008). 
81 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory & Design, Mason, OH: South-Western College 
Publishing, 2003, 54. 
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In any organization, uncertainty can also come from complexity and instability 
from within the organization as well.  At the same time, uncertainty at one level can be 
derived from deficiencies in information and resources from the external environment of 
higher level of a hierarchical organization.  The environment surrounding the execution 
of operations is complex due to the varying number and divergence of the subordinate 
organizations, and unstable due to the instability of doctrinal tasks.  The absence of 
policy and guidance, as well as the absence of clear outlined goals while developing and 
waging a strategy, has the potential to underscore the ability of organizations to operate 
in an effective and synergistic manner. 
However, if we look at the basic problem we see that uncertainty, which is 
responsible for the information demand, can be reduced.  As a result, organizations 
should not get obsessed on the generation of information but should consider ways of 
reducing needs for information flows.  There are instances where the receipt of 
information does not mean that uncertainty is resolved.  The latest technology revolution 
only exacerbates the amount of information exchanged between organizations, resulting 
in information overload.  With this elevated amount of information, the difficulty 
becomes turning raw information into knowledge that is usable.  Even with the increased 
use of automation to help filter relevant information, volumes of raw information 
confront organizations.     
Additionally, our tendency is to generate swelling amounts of information to 
reduce the uncertainties we face in today's turbulent environment.  However, due to the 
nature of the environment change will be inevitable.  No matter what an organization 
may do to reduce uncertainty and increase predictability, there will always be gap of the 
information required and the information needed.82 This is because information is a fluid 
source that can be exchanged or interchanged with other information, and may become 
obsolete or untrue with time, thus decreasing its value.  This is not to say that 
organizations will never mitigate and reduce the information gap  




3. Organizational Propositions 
In this section of the thesis, organizational concepts and theories are used to 
develop propositions that help understand the influence that organizational theory has on 
the integration of IO.  Using organizational theory can help explain the behavior of 
military units when faced with increased complexity and environmental uncertainty in 
combat.  The following propositions are the result of the authors’ research.        
 i. The more complex the conflict, the more likely the integration of IO. 
Effective organizations facing complex environments adapt by becoming more internally 
complex themselves.  They horizontally differentiate.  In the case of the military, they 
create more specialized units and more military occupational specialties but to be 
efficient, they should not become more complex than they need to be to accomplish their 
tasks.  To avoid overloading their leaders, they must decentralize decisions to the 
operational core and invest in high levels of training and education for the operators, who 
are then empowered to use their judgment to make decisions.  Because they are 
specialized, they require higher levels of horizontal and vertical integration (reference 
Lawrence and Lorsch).  To the degree their work tasks require operators and units to be 
highly interdependent, passing work back and forth to each other, to that degree planning 
and standard operating procedures must be supplemented by vertical, and especially, 
horizontal coordination mechanisms (e.g., integrator roles, liaison roles, matrix 
structures)  (Reference Galbraith and Thompson).        
 ii. Highly trained “elite” units are more likely to integrate IO into combat 
operations.  Both Weber and Mintzberg discuss ideas that apply functional specialization 
(Special Forces) to organizations as well as relations between larger units or divisions of 
an organization.  Special Operations forces, which have higher levels of professionalism, 
training, and education, are better suited to operate in complex environments where 
people are empowered to use their professionalism, training, and education.  Defining the 
organizational structure ensures that resources and energy are not misguided and 
misused.   
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 iii. The attitude of the military command’s commitment towards IO, 
positive or negative, will determine whether integration occurs.  Military commanders 
who do not believe in the concept of IO will not apply resources, time, and energy into 
the integration into combat operations.  Leaders who are not committed to the integration 
of IO will see a lower performance from it during combat operations.     
 iv. Adversity will spur U.S. forces to integrate IO into combat operations.  
The perceptual view of environmental uncertainty is process oriented and seeks to 
describe the stages involved in noticing, interpreting, or learning the environment in order 
to reach closure as to its meaning.  This proposition proposes that military organizations 
faced with high levels of uncertainty will integrate IO into operations.      
C. INFORMATIONAL FRAME OF REFERENCE 
To examine the impact of information theory requires one to understand the 
context in which the theory is used.  With the development of full spectrum operations in 
2001, the concepts of information operations and the theory associated with it became 
more prevalent.83  Following the full spectrum guidance that there is but one operational 
environment in which the operations are conducted.  The operational environment is “a 
composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of 
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.”84  As illustrated in Figure 2, it 
encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) 
and the information environment.85  Included within these domains are the systems of 
friendly, neutral, and adversaries that are relevant to specific a given operation.   
Operations occur within a complex framework of environmental factors that 
shape their nature and affect their outcomes.  This requires a broad understanding of the 
strategic and operational environment and their relevance to each mission.  This includes 
the characteristics of the particular operational environment as it relates to each mission, 
                                                 83 In 2001, FM 3-0 introduced the concept of Full Spectrum Operations into the Army capstone 
manual. 




as well as aspects of the environment that become essential elements in shaping how 
Army forces conduct operations.86  These factors include six elements that combine to 
form the operations environment; they are Political, Military, Economic, Social, 
Infrastructure, and Information.  Information operations fall within the concept of the 
information environment that is part of the operational environment construct. 
 
       
Figure 2.    The Interconnected Operational Environment  
                                                 86 Department of the Army.  Field Manual 3-0, Operations. February 27, 2008.  Washington, D.C.: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008.  
https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_aa/pdf/fm3_0.pdf (accessed February 27, 2008). 
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1. Information Environment  
To drill deeper into the integration of IO, we must continue to gain an 
understanding of information theory and the level at which it is employed.  The 
information environment defined is the “as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, 
and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.”87  This 
environment is where individuals, groups, leaders, and decision makers use, create, 
display, and distribute information so others may see, feel, or make a decision on the 
information received.  Information operations and all activities associated with 
information operations occur within the broader context of the information environment.   
The information environment recognizes the critical role that information itself, as 
well as the information systems, play in today’s advanced societies as they progressed 
along a continuum from agrarian, to industrial, to the information age.88  This 
environment pervades and transcends the boundaries of land, sea, air, and space while 
having a significant effect on the outcome of operations.  Within this environment exist 
three conceptual dimensions: physical, information, and cognitive.   
a. Physical  
The physical dimension is the tangible or real world, where things are 
experienced by one of the five senses (see, hear, smell, touch, and taste).  It is the 
material part of the information environment that overlaps with the operating 
environments of land, sea, air, and space.  The physical dimension includes geography 
(terrain), weather, populace, and civil infrastructure (including communications networks 
and media) each of which is important to combat and maneuver operations.  Military 
leaders often gauge military maneuver and combat operations success or failure in the 
physical dimension by the items listed above.  
                                                 87 Department of the Army.  Field Manual 3-0, Operations.  February 27, 2008.  Washington, D.C.: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008.  
https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_aa/pdf/fm3_0.pdf (accessed February 27, 2008). 
88 Information Operations Primer, AY 07, November 2006, 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dmspo/Publications/Publications1.htm#CampaignPlanningPrimer 
(accessed May 20, 2008). 
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This dimension is also where the hardware of information systems 
(routers, switches, cables, and computers) and the networks that connect these systems 
reside and operate.  The characteristics listed above also affect the use of information 
system assets and the linking of information systems into networks. 
b.   Information  
 Information operations seek to affect the content and flow of information 
produced, shaped, transmitted, and collectively shared in this dimension.  This theoretical 
layer includes elements relevant to the electronic collection, transmission, processing, 
storage, and display of information that can be electronic, human-to-human, or a 
combination of both.  It describes the formal and informal communications infrastructure, 
networks, kinship and descent relationships, licit and illicit commercial relationships and, 
social affiliations that collectively create, process, manipulate, transmit, and share 
information in an operational area.  As viewed in figure 3, the information dimension is 
the conduit that links the physical world with the human consciousness of the cognitive 
dimension, it can be the information itself or both as a source of input and to convey 
output.   
Vital characteristics in this dimension include those essential to 
information management and command and control (C2). The characteristics are 
information quality (accuracy, timeliness, relevance, and consistency), distribution 
(range, sharing, and continuity), and interaction (exchange or flow of information).  
These characteristics affect information content and the functions of information systems.   
The information dimension typically falls into one of two schools of 
thought, information as the message and information as the medium.89  Following the 
information as the message school of thought leads to the belief of IO as an integrating 
concept for all operations.  The rational extent of such a line of thinking could produce a 
                                                 89 There are two generally accepted theories of information.  First, information as message-regards 
information as an immaterial message or signal that contains meaningful content that a sender can transmit 
to a receiver.  Second, information as medium-relates information to the message but also views 
information as a system or conduit that transmits a message from sender to receiver.  See Arquilla, John, 
and Ronfeldt, David, In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1997), pages 145-152. 
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fundamental transformation of warfighting and warfare.  This change would state that 
warfighting along with all other forms of human interaction fall under the construct of 
communication.  
The second school of thought leads some to believe in a more solid and 
controllable concept that IO is a capability.  Following this school of thought leads to the 
development of information weapon systems in a traditional manner that is integrated 
into the larger scheme of warfighting.  This view simply integrates new information age 
technological capabilities underneath the timeless understanding of combat. 
c.   Cognitive 
The cognitive dimension exists in the mind.  The most important of the 
three dimensions according to JP 3-13, this dimension is where human beings process 
information received according to their unique set of norms, morals, beliefs, culture, and 
values.90  These attributes act as a filter of the information and provide a sense of 
meaning and context that is evaluated and processed to form a decision.  This decision is 
then communicated back through the information dimension to the physical world.      
It should be noted that the cognitive dimension cannot be directly attacked 
but must be influenced indirectly through the physical and information dimensions. 
                                                 90 Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, February 13, 2006.  
(Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 2006), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf (accessed 
March 6, 2008). 
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Figure 3.    The Information Environment Construct91   
 
2. Informational Propositions 
IO theory requires the knowledge of the information environment that 
encompasses the three domains physical, cognitive, information.  These factors drive the 
integration of IO into combat operations.   
i. Greater availability of information technology fosters the 
integration of IO.  This proposition follows the physical dimension belief that a greater 
use of computer or social networks will allow greater integration.     
ii. The more extended the operations, the more likely the integration 
of IO.  This proposition follows the second school of thought in the information 
dimension that information used as a medium leads to the belief that IO is a capability not 
the message. 
                                                 91 Marc Romanych, “Applying the Domains of Conflict to Information Operations” 10TH International 
Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium the Future of C2.  http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463046&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed October 13, 2008). 
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iii. More networking will foster integration.  This proposition follows 
the physical dimension that military leaders often gauge military maneuver and combat 
operations success or failure in the physical dimension by the items listed above.  
iv. Using a netcentric approach to warfare allows easier integration for 
units.  This proposition follows the use of cognitive and physical dimensions to integrate 
IO.        
D. CONCEPT  
Operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Philippines and Iraq have afforded the 
military the opportunity to conduct IO and to document experiences and lessons from 
these real world operations.  A number of experiments and exercises also have explored 
new military concepts that included the use of non-kinetic IO as a means of national 
power to influence adversary behavior and actions.  Yet the military still struggles with 
the integration of IO from the planning of operations until the completion of phase four.   
Using the organization and information theories described previously to generate 
a list of propositions provides a more thorough understanding of what is required to 
integrate IO into combat operations.  By validating propositions introduced in this 
chapter through the four case studies, each theory gains credibility for each proposition 
confirmed.  The result will provide a clearer picture as to which theory influences the 
integration of information operations in combat operations.    
E. METHOD  
Looking through two frames of reference (organizational and informational), this 
thesis will try to determine which frame of reference has a greater ability to explain how 
and why IO is integrated into combat operations.  The first frame of reference utilizes the 
propositions developed from Henry Mintzberg and Richard Daft’s organizational 
theories.  This thesis will determine if military commanders and their organizations are 




environments.  Second, utilizing propositions developed from literature by Claude 
Shannon, John Arquilla, and Martin Libicki, this thesis will determines if external forces 
influence the integration of IO.  
Utilizing the aforementioned theories, four different case studies were chosen in 
which IO was integrated into operations; Bosnia, Operation Enduring Freedom 
(Afghanistan), Operation Enduring Freedom (Philippines), Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
These four case studies were chosen for the following reasons.  First, each of the cases 
involved the use of an information operations organization at various levels of the 
command structure.  Second, each were considered major operations carried out by U.S. 
military forces with integrated information operations from the strategic to the tactical 
level with varying degrees of success.  Third, information operations doctrine covers all 
four conflicts but with different versions, FM 100-6 for Bosnia, OEF (Afghanistan), OIF-
Philippines and, FM 3-13 for OIF, thus providing the ability to compare the different 
military IO organizational structures and IO theory during each of the four conflicts.  
Lastly, while each of the four conflicts integrated IO plans and organizations into their 
operations, the size of the conflicts and the type of military personnel that carried out the 
operations were different.  During OEF and the Philippines, special operations forces 
were largely in the lead while in Bosnia and OIF, conventional forces were the bulk of 
the forces employed.  This contrast will allow for the comparison of not only the IO 
theory but the organization structure of SOF versus conventional. 
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IV. INTEGRATION OF IO IN COMBAT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In previous chapters, this thesis has addressed the historical and theorized issues 
the Army has faced while trying to integrate IO into field operations.  Using the frames of 
reference and propositions developed in the Chapter 3, this chapter will explore which 
frame of reference has greater ability to explain the integration of IO into combat 
operations.  Organizational theory shows a tendency for the organizations faced with 
complex environments to decentralize, to increase the number of information processes, 
and to rely on staffs and subordinates empowered by senior leaders to assist as 
complexity increases.  Information theory shows a tendency to focus on information as 
the message and information as the medium, using three dimensions of physical, 
information, and cognitive to address the complex problems faced in today’s operational 
environment, thus encouraging more integration.  
B. BOSNIA (OPERATIONS JOINT ENDEAVOR, GUARD & FORGE) 
On August 30, 1995, NATO began “Operation Deliberate Force” when aircraft 
began attacking Serb positions around Sarajevo.  This operation allowed the Bosnian-
Croat coalition to make significant gains and set the conditions for a cease-fire on 
October 5, leading to the Dayton Peace Accords.  To implement the provisions of the 
Accords, the Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed to the region.  Consisting of 60,000 
troops from NATO and non-NATO states, IFOR’s primary tasks included enforcing 
compliance with the cease-fire, withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of 
separation, collection of heavy weapons into cantonment sites and barracks, conditions 
for the safe, orderly, and speedy withdrawal of UN forces.92 
The deployment of the 1st Armored Division set the stage for information 
operations to make its debut in modern conflict.  The early focus of Task Force Eagle 
aimed at securing heavy weapons systems and separating the former warring factions to 
                                                 
92 Larry K. Wentz, “Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience” http://call.army.mil/ (accessed 
December 11, 2001). 
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their respective sides of a newly established 4-kilometer wide “zone of separation.”  By 
April 29, 1996, IFOR accomplished all provisions of the military annex of the Dayton 
Accords, changing the main effort to garnering support for the provisions of the Dayton 
Accords.  This was difficult due to former warring factions working to discredit IFOR 
and the Dayton Accords.  The frustration is seen in U.S. Ambassador Richard 
Holbrooke’s June 1996, letter to President Clinton, stating, “[Bosnian Serb Leader] 
Karadzic uses television and controlled media to prevent local reconciliation efforts.”93  
Entering Bosnia, U.S. Forces faced a complex and unstable environment as they 
moved to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords.  First, the Dayton Accords did not designate 
a single authority to synchronize the military, political, and humanitarian aspects of the 
mission enforcing the accords.  Second, U.S. Forces in Bosnia embarked on the task of 
building support for the Dayton Accords utilizing information operations when no clear 
doctrine for IO existed.  U.S. forces worked for six months using a ‘trial-and-error’ 
approach to IO planning94 before the Army’s first doctrinal manual on information 
operations appeared.95  Third, the U.S. military faced three warring factions (Bosniac, 
Serb, and Croat) each with different ethnic, religious, and political objectives.  Last, the 
operational environment of Bosnia played a major role in the fight for peace.  These four 
factors are by no means the only factors that led to environmental uncertainty but showed 
how complex and unstable the U.S. mission in Bosnia was.  
Task Force Eagle officers noted, “The need for non-lethal attack options revealed 
the void in existing tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP).”96  With no clear guidance 
and no doctrine, Task Force Eagle relied on historical hierarchical organizational forms 
and doctrine.  However, given the restraints on the organization by Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) and the mission set of peace enforcement, U.S. forces sought to use non-kinetic/ 
                                                 93 Richard Holbrooke. To End A War (New York: Random House, 1998): 340. 
94 Center For Army Lessons Learned, “IO in a Peace Enforcement Environment” Newsletter no. 99-2 
http://call.army.mil/call.html (accessed November 7, 2001). 
95 The U.S. Army formally introduced the concept for Information Operations in 1995 when Pamphlet 
525-69, Concept for Information Operations was released. 
96 Lt. Col. Steven Curtis, USA, Cpt. Robert A.B. Curtis, USA, and Maj. (Ret.) Marc J. Romanych, 
USA, “Integrating Targeting and Information Operations in Bosnia,” Field Artillery (July-August 1998): 
32. 
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influential means.  This change in historically lethal tasks of finding, fixing, and 
eliminating the enemy moved to tasks that informed, deceived, exploited, and influenced 
the former warring factions and the civilian population.  The change in task was not easy, 
as Colonel Mark T. Kimmitt (Commander of the Task Force Eagle Artillery) commented, 
“In peace enforcement, the goal is not to defeat, destroy, or delay things.  The goal is to 
persuade, compel, or moderate behaviors.”97    
With no doctrinal guidance on IO, units sought to reduce the uncertainty by 
utilizing organic tasks and organizations to function in the information environment.  The 
fire support element became the primary benefactor to reduce the uncertainty of IO when 
“the Commander of TFE and MND-N placed IO under the control of the [Deputy Fire 
Support Coordinator] and used the Division [Fire Support Element] as its base structure” 
returning to an organizational structure he understood.  98      
Task Force Eagle organized the battle staff to integrate IO into overall operations 
to combat the FWF.  First with the fire support element and later with a field support 
team (FST) from the Land Information Warfare Agency (LIWA) which assisted in the 
unfamiliar doctrinal area and reduced the uncertainty of conducting IO in Bosnia.  To 
further drive the uncertainty into a stable-complex dimension, U.S. forces established the 
Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) chaired by the LIWA FST commander.  
This initially adhoc working group met weekly to coordinate IO efforts and consisted of 
representatives from the various staff elements and subordinate unit representatives.  
While IO was the primary means of accomplishing the Task Force mission, integration 
was led by an officer not organically assigned to the unit and planned by an ad hoc 
committee (IOWG) acting with limited doctrinal guidance.  U.S. military leaders seeing 
the inherent weaknesses in this structure moved to “normalize” the integration of IO into 
the established battle rhythm.   
                                                 97 Col. Mark T. Kimmitt, USA, “Fire Support in Bosnia-Herzegovina: An Overview,” Field Artillery 
4(July-August 1998): 30. 
98 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (IO) NEWSLETTER NO.  99-15 
Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Civil Affairs and Public Affairs Support to IO,” 
http://call.army.mil/call.html (November 7, 2001). 
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Perhaps the most vital lesson learned was that the synchronization of Public 
Affairs (PA), Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) as non-lethal 
weapons was indispensable in conducting effective IO.  Civil Affairs played a remarkable 
role in Bosnia by coordinating the humanitarian relief effort, assisting and educating the 
newly formed Bosnian government, and aiding in the re-establishment of government 
services.  As Captain Tom Anthony, a Civil Affairs officer who served in Bosnia states, 
“Simply put, our job was to be facilitators.  At one end of the spectrum were large 
projects to help villages whose whole infrastructure needed to be fixed, and at the other 
were things like getting firewood to senior citizens in the mountains who couldn't chop 
their own as winter set in.”99  The second lesson was the incorporation and publication of 
information that was timely, accurate, and relevant.  To accomplish this task, IFOR 
conducted an information campaign designed to seize and maintain the initiative by 
imparting timely and effective information within the commander's intent.   
The information campaign was composed of two elements: input and output.  The 
output element was designed to establish IFOR's credibility with the international media 
in order to gain support of operations, while a psychological operations (PSYOP) 
campaign was designed to shape the local population's perception in favor of IFOR 
troops and activities.  This two-pronged approach to disseminate information allowed 
Public Affairs to deal with journalists, while PSYOP carried the message to the local 
population through IFOR-owned media: a TV production section, six organic and 56 
affiliated radio stations, a national weekly newspaper, The Herald of Peace, a youth 
magazine Mircko, posters, and handbills.100  The input element came from a variety of 
traditional means, including units conducting patrols, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) assets, as well as reports from various staff elements (high); 
however, two input mechanisms proved of particular value in providing input to the IO 
cell.  First, the Joint Military Commission (JMC) was an established meeting with two or 
                                                 99 Dennis Steele, “The Human Touch: Civil Affairs in Bosnia.“  Army.  FindArticles.com. 30 Oct. 
2008.  http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/is_199704/ai_n8767189 (accessed November 12, 2008). 
100 Layton L. Wentz, R. L., Landon, J. J., Bair, A., Dziedzic, M. J., Combelles-Siegel, P., et al. (1998). 
In Wentz L. (Ed.), Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR experience.  Washington D.C.: NATIONAL 
DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES.  Retrieved from 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA461623 (accessed May 2008) 
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more FWF military representatives (usually commanders).  At such meetings, the FWFs 
met under IFOR supervision to coordinate joint activities, disseminate intent and 
instructions, and to resolve differences.101  As illustrated in Figure 4 Task Force Eagle 
JMC Operations, the JMC produced a tremendous amount of information that fed into the 
IO cell to determine success, shortfalls, and direction needed for the information 
campaign.  
 
Figure 4.    Task Force Eagle JMC Operations  
 
The second input mechanism was the Joint Commission Observer teams (JCO) 
comprised of U.S. Special Forces.  Living among the population, JCO teams conducted 
business in a lower profile in an effort to present a less threatening image to the people in 
their sectors.  With key tasks of “direct liaison, communications, and information 
exchange with the former warfighting faction (FWF) forces,” JCO teams identified 
contacted and maintained open dialogue with key players and power brokers in the 
communities in which they lived and operated.102  This provided commanders with 
                                                 101 John Pike, “Section II.  Policy: JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS.”  GlobalSecurity.Org. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_96-8_sec2.htm (accessed October 13, 2008). 
102 Michael L. Findlay. Special Forces Integration with Multinational Division-North in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, A Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and 
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 21, 1998. 
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unique capabilities which conventional units were not organized or trained to provide.  
First, they offered accurate assessments of the sentiments of the population through daily 
interaction with the people in their sector.  Second, they provided a conduit to key 
personnel in the event of an emergency or crisis.  Last, they provided ground truth and 
accurate reporting of critical events from the local population’s perspective.   
JCO teams organized into functional areas to focus on specific warring factions 
and critical areas within the community.  One team (political) worked on 
communications with the local Bosnian mayors, members of parliament, political party 
leaders and international or regional organizations such as the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe.  Another team (military) worked to know military leaders 
within the sector, the locations of units and their strengths, their weaknesses, and their 
concerns.  A third team focused on judicial and law enforcement working with the local 
and national police, members of the judicial system, and the courts within the sector.  
Working in functional teams allowed the JCO to accurately read the sentiment of the 
population and notify their higher headquarters of impending problems or unrest before 
they occurred. 
Like many organizations today, the U.S. military entering Bosnia was a 
bureaucracy, where authority and responsibility fall under a hierarchy.  Following the 
traditional military structure, military activities and task were organized within sub-units 
(division, brigade, battalion, company) performing functions at the three levels of warfare 
(strategic, operational, tactical).  Units completing complex tasks in Bosnia quickly 
realized the importance of both vertical and horizontal integration of IO when the 
traditional hierarchical structure operated as functional, divisional, and matrix 
organizations.  This constituted a tough challenge in quickly reporting information due to 
time-consuming reporting requirements in a traditional chain of command, where each 
level of authority requires processing information before passing it up.  This required 
organizations to act in a functional manner rather than the traditional divisional structure.  
During the campaign, an unprecedented amount of information flowed from 
Washington to European headquarters, to intermediate staging bases, and to the front line 
troops in Bosnia and back.  Clusters of networks connected NATO headquarters with the 
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Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, while another set connected units inside the 
Bosnia Theater of Operation.  U.S. forces in Bosnia realized that targeting information 
extended beyond the battlefield and involved more than attacking an adversary’s 
information flow and systems.  It also requires awareness and sensitivity to information 
received through nonmilitary means.  This realization, along with the speed and 
frequency of data transmitted, caused a significant change in the way U.S. forces 
conducted military operations and warfare.  
The communication infrastructure was very robust with military and commercial 
communication networks set up from the U.S. to the soldier on the ground.  Limited by 
large amounts of damage to commercial communications infrastructure and interference 
by FWF, the U.S. was prevented from developing the commercial communications 
capability to support military operations.103  For support, military tactical satellite assets 
deployed to ensure that dual and triple connectivity could be established, with gaps in 
coverage filled by leased commercial satellite vendors.  This planning ensured that 
tactical and commercial networks provided a reliable long haul and regional CIS 
network.   
Internally, U.S. brigades and battalions connected to the headquarters and each 
other through several automation systems.  The Maneuver Control System (MCS) 
provided secure means of transmitting orders, maps, diagrams, and classified e-mail.  
WARLORD, an intelligence terminal, handled most intelligence products, including 
imagery logistical and administrative systems, which were in place to handle a multitude 
of information.  This vast network created a patchwork-operating environment rather than 
an efficient system of systems.  However, the network did allow for the timely 
transmission of data, such as unit patrol reports and JCO assessments, to the functional 
information chain, which linked public information officers throughout theater.       
From the informational dimension, the IOWG played a critical role because IO 
was Task Force Eagle’s primary means of influencing popular support of the Dayton 
Accords.  Planning, coordinating, and synchronizing efforts allowed the division to speak 
                                                 103 All three factions damaged commercial communications facilities during the course of the conflict.   
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in one voice, leverage the truth, and use multiple messages through multiple channels to 
achieve desired objectives.  For example, if a stated objective was to “Mitigate ethnic 
tensions related to the return of displaced persons in town x,” then radio shows would be 
used to inform the populace that increased financial investment by the international 
community was tied to their maintaining a safe and secure environment.  Newspaper ads 
could promote ethnic tolerance and warn the population that MND (N) and SFOR would 
not tolerate obstruction of the return.  U.S. military leaders would conduct Bilats104 to 
influence or co-opt local leadership to encourage acceptance and maintain law and order 
reducing ethnic tension.105  
On occasion, the physical dimension bled into the information and cognitive 
dimensions as on September 1, 1997, when TFE forces seized a Bosnian-Serb run radio 
tower to halt the broadcasting of anti-IFOR propaganda.106  The seizure halted the 
broadcast, removed an asset from Bosnian Serb leaders, and had a psychological affect 
on station operators and Serbian leadership.  The station was returned after Republika 
Srpska leaders promised to refrain from spreading inflammatory propaganda.107  Public 
Affairs supported these efforts and worked in parallel with the PSYOP efforts to 
convince the former warring factions and the population to refrain from further fighting 
amongst themselves or from attacking coalition forces.   
A critical requirement was the feedback from the information environment.  
Measures of effectiveness consisted of the receipt of information content through public 
opinion polls, surveys, media analysis, human intelligence (HUMINT), tactical PSYOP 
teams, and patrols that provided important information concerning perceptions, attitudes, 
and behaviors of the FWF and the population.  Additional measures of performance 
related to the flow of information and assessed the short-term effects.  The combination 
                                                 104 BiLats were meetings conducted with the former warring factions that were chaired by a U.S. 
military leader. 
105 Timothy LaBahn, “Information Operations in Bosnia.” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 2001. 
106 SFOR Public Affairs. “Task Force Eagle-Multinational Division- North (Eagle base) in Bosnia.” 
http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/TFE/SFOR_History.htm (accessed November 3, 2008). 
107 Maj. Arthur N. Tulak, “The Application of Information Operations Doctrine in Support of Peace 
Operations,” CGSC MMAS Thesis, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.SACGSC, 1999): 89. 
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of the two determined whether the themes and messages were delivered to the target, 
whether or not the target received them, and whether the dispersion of the themes and 
messages were achieved in the engagement.  The true effectiveness of IO engagements 
and campaigns were determined over time based on the actions of targets and perceptible 
changes in the environment.  Continuous assessment provided the basis for adjusting 
future informational activities. 
From the cognitive dimension, the U.S. military employed a multipronged 
approach designed to deter the FWF from violating the Dayton Peace Accords and 
attacking NATO troops, as well as convincing the population that full compliance with 
the Dayton Peace Accords meant a brighter future.  To accomplish this campaign, U.S. 
forces relied on the coordination and synchronization of public information and 
psychological operations.   
Though public information and PSYOP were historically separated, the mission 
of peace-enforcement made it possible to link public affairs and psychological operations 
(HIGH).108  The design of the information campaign allowed public affairs to focus on 
the external media and journalist, while PSYOP focused on the local population without 
the mediation of journalists.  PAO and PSYOP worked openly and transparently, relying 
on similar guidance, themes, and messages to reach their specific audience. They utilized 
IFOR-owned media that included a TV production section, 6 organic and 56 affiliated 
radio stations, a national weekly newspaper (The Herald of Peace), a youth magazine 
(Mircko), posters, and handbills. 
As part of an operational campaign, the entertainment format of the U.S. owned 
radio station focused on children, teenagers, and young adults while the vast majority of 
messages (mostly in English and not Serbo-Croatian) were targeted at an older 
                                                 108 Traditionally PAO and PSYOP are separated due to their different missions and philosophies.  
Psychological operations are designed to shape target audiences' perceptions so that they create the least 
possible interference with friendly forces.  Public Affairs have a dual function, first gain and maintain 
public opinion support for the operation; it is also used as a 'public diplomacy' tool designed to pressure 
adversaries into a friendly course of action.  Second, public affairs are the means by which a commander 
reports to the people how their children and tax dollars are used.  This entails some obligations such as 
truthful and timely reporting. 
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population.109  Coupled with the ability of the Tactical PSYOP Teams to just talk with or 
“hang out” with locals at coffee shops, restaurants, or in private homes allowed the 
soldiers to cut through the red tape and speak to the people in real terms.  These face-to-
face engagements allowed immediate access to population sentiment based on impact 
statements discussed with the target audience thus allowing U.S soldiers to accomplish 
more in a shorter amount of time.  Armed with talking points, the TPTs were able to 
provide the “party line” to the locals on sensitive issues. 
1. Summary 
Over the course of ground force intervention in Bosnia by the United States from 
December 1996 to December 2004, the U.S. military learned a number of valuable 
lessons about the integration of information operations and associated elements.  It is 
easy to see the complex environment in which the U.S. Forces worked.  The four factors 
of no single authority to synchronize political, military, and humanitarian actions, no IO 
doctrine, various warring factions with varying support levels and a mature operating 
environment all support a complex environment.  However, the integration of IO into 
combat operations is not because of the complexity and instability of the environment.  
Rather the command atmosphere, rules of engagement, and the need to use non-
traditional means to influence, inform, and co-opt drove the integration of IO.   
Facing a hostile information environment, where the FWF had mature propaganda 
and disinformation campaigns already in full swing, the U.S. adapted to the elements 
within the Bosnia operational environment.  Adversity forced by constrictive measures 
spurred commanders to integrate IO into operations.  In order to garner support, Task 
Force Eagle organized the battle staff to integrate IO into overall operations.  First with 
the fire support element and later with a field support team (FST) from the Land 
Information Warfare Agency (LIWA) whom assisted to reduce the uncertainty of 
conducting IO in Bosnia.  The organic structure of the FSE allowed the integration of IO 
                                                 109 Layton L. Wentz, R. L. Landon, J. J. Bair, A. Dziedzic, M. J., Combelles-Siegel, P., et al. (1998).  
In Wentz L. (Ed.), Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR experience.  Washington D.C.: NATIONAL 
DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES.  
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA461623 (accessed June 20, 2008). 
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cells at the IFOR headquarters, the TFE headquarters, and down to the battalion 
headquarters level, which ensured the vertical integration using the organic structure.       
The deployment and wide availability of computers and networks provided the 
U.S. military the ability to collaborate with a speed and efficiency never before 
experienced in the military.  Often, media reports of incidents would reach the home 
country and or higher headquarters before the commander on the ground was aware of 
the situation and able to react.110  This near-real-time situational awareness allowed the 
staff elements to quickly analyze during crisis and correct the overall information 
campaign in an accurate manner.  The constant flow of information through the various 
channels to and from the population ensured that information operations became vital for 
the commander as “information” and the fight for it became a daily occurrence.  
Civil affairs soldiers worked closely with civilian agencies (NGOs, PVOs, and 
IOs) that developed a network of influential contacts, compiled historical and specialty 
archives, and established relationships with local leaders and business people.  This 
allowed U.S. commanders to understand the infrastructure of the region, as well as the 
political and economic influences.  This working relationship with civilian agencies and 
centers of operation were both passive intelligence sources and consumers of intelligence 
information. 
Whether by coincidence or design, the reality of networks both social and 
computer played a considerable role in Bosnia.  Both enabled information to be sent and 
received from the population and former warring factions.  Both had redundant channels 
of communication and enabled IO to complete tasks and objectives of the command.  
Last, the ability of these networks to develop as needed was crucial to mission 
accomplishment, as in the case of the public information network that streamlines 
information flow.   
                                                 110 Layton L Wentz, R. L. Landon, J. J. Bair, A. Dziedzic, M. J., Combelles-Siegel, P., et al. (1998).  In 
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Overall, the Bosnian conflict displayed the value of integrating information 
operations into combat operations.  The two theories (organizational & informational) in 
this conflict are complementary to each other and of equal explanatory power, rather than 
one being better than the other is.  Organizational theories provide the backbone while 
the information theories are the meat of the military unit.  Ultimately, the proper 
integration of IO requires a collaboration of theories to defeat our adversaries.     
C. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (AFGHANISTAN) 
On October 7, 2001, the United States and its allies initiated Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan with the stated goal of disrupting the use of Afghanistan as a 
terrorist base of operation.  The initial attacks on the Taliban and Al Qaeda training 
camps and infrastructure were a response to the September 11, 2001, attack  on the 
Pentagon and World Trade Center.  With the nation standing behind the president, the 
U.S. sought to topple the regime supporting Al Qaeda and take revenge on the terrorist 
network.   
The country of Afghanistan presented a difficult operational environment for U.S. 
and coalition forces.   During the seven-years, the Taliban controlled the information 
environment and imposed a strict version of Sharia law that banned a wide variety of 
activities to include: employment and education for women, movies, television, videos, 
music, dancing, hanging pictures in homes, and clapping during sports events.  To 
enforce these rules, the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice 
(PVSV) used “religious police” to ensure the population complied.  Religious police 
often beat offenders — typically men who shaved and women who were not wearing 
their burqa properly — with long sticks.111  Information passed from the ruling Taliban 
regime to the population internally, while externally, information to and from 
Afghanistan was limited due to Taliban restrictions.  This restricted environment was 
amplified by the physical shortfalls of the country’s infrastructure.      
                                                 111 Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia.” London, U.K. 
I.B.Tauris, 2002. 
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From a physical dimension, the country was geographically constrained by the 
landlocked, mountainous topography.  Complicating matters further, the long war with 
the Soviet Union and disregard by the Taliban resulted in no modern infrastructure 
existing within the country.  Roads, airfields, and scarce public services were still largely 
in a state of disrepair from the Soviet occupation of the 1980s and presented a logistical 
nightmare to planners considering large-scale conventional troop movements.  With the 
difficult operational environment in planners’ minds, the national command authority 
made the decision to inset special operations forces into the country to provide 
coordination with the Northern Alliance and other local Afghan militias opposed to the 
Taliban regime in addition to working closely with CIA teams to influence neutral 
Afghan warlords to join the fight.112  
The U.S. and coalition forces entering Afghanistan faced the complex task of 
cobbling together support from the patchwork of tribes in the northern part of the 
country.  The complexity of working with multiple countries for support, as well as 
numerous ethnic militias’ of the United Islamic Front (UIF) for the Salvation of 
Afghanistan (otherwise known as the Northern Alliance by the west) proved a complex 
task.  To highlight the difficulty, one need only look at the Northern Alliance to see the 
complexity.  Within the Northern Alliance, five groups make up the alliance where three 
main ethnic groups dominated the UIF.  The three groups were the Tajiks, who make up 
27% of Afghanistan's population and are the second largest ethnic group, the Hazara, and 
the Uzbeks who each make up about 9% of the population.113  Each of these groups 
followed a tribal leader who agreed on some level to support the Northern Alliance to 
combat the Taliban and its rule of Afghanistan.  While the relationship with the Northern 
Alliance was complex, the cooperation functioned well during the defeat of a common 
enemy in the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 
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To support the ground force, strike airframes like the F/A-18, focused on the area 
in and around the cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar to destroy key targets while 
the use of EC-130H Compass Call and the EA-6B Prowler disrupted the communications 
and air defense networks of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  Several weeks into the campaign, 
the focus shifted when the Northern Alliance insisted the air campaign focus more on 
close air support for the front line troops.  In coordination with these efforts, CENTCOM 
used the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) to influence the Afghan 
populace using broadcast messages on Afghan radio and television frequencies along 
with posters, leaflets, and handbills given to the Afghans providing them information.  
Adding to the complexity was the fact that no conventional war plan existed to 
fight in Afghanistan, nor did the U.S. maintain basing arrangements with any neighboring 
countries from which ground forces could rapidly enter Afghanistan.114  The choice to 
send a smaller, highly trained and flexible Special Operations force simplified command 
and control as the chain of command went from U.S Central Command (CENTCOM) 
directly to the special operations soldiers operating in Afghanistan.  Driving the 
operations environment into a stable-complex dimension, CENTCOM established three 
Combined/Joint Special Operations Task Forces (C/JSOTFs) to operate in Afghanistan.  
C/JSOTF-North, codenamed Task Force Dagger, formed around the 5th Special Forces 
Group (Airborne) to conduct initial operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.115  
Combined/Joint Special Operations Task Force-South (C/JSOTF-South), codenamed 
Task Force K-Bar and originally consisted of a U.S. Navy SEAL element and the Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) of other coalition nations, arrived in Afghanistan in late 
November 2001, and augmented in December by one company from the 1st Battalion, 5th 
SFG (A).116  The final C/JSOTF, codenamed Task Force Sword, conducted operations 
that remain classified. 
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2004). 
116 Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger-On the Ground with Special Forces in 
Afghanistan, Random House (New York: 2003), 267. 
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The U.S. military quickly accomplished many military tasks, taking just 70 days 
from the start of hostilities to defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and remove the Taliban 
from power.  On the ground, U.S. and Coalition Special Forces (SF) teams provided 
targeting information to coalition attack aircraft.  This proved highly successful, as 
Afghan tribes working with the U.S. were able to capture city after city from the 
weakened Taliban.  After the joint Northern Alliance/U.S. military force seized Kandahar 
in December, many of the Taliban fled to join the remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda 
coalition continue to mount resistance in southern areas of Afghanistan. 
The U.S. military deployed with an extensive tactical network consisting of 
satellite terminals, telephone switchboards, and data network operation equipment 
enabling the capability to conduct operations within Afghanistan.  This network allowed 
U.S. forces to augment and synchronize Northern Alliance communication with organic, 
tactical communication systems of the U.S. Special Forces linking them to coalition 
airpower networks.  As the operations matured, communication sites were set up at 
CFLCC Forward in Uzbekistan, with the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division in 
Bagram, Afghanistan and with Task Force Rakkasan (3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st 
Airborne Division) in Kandahar, Afghanistan.117  These hubs provided command, 
control, communications, computers, and Internet (C4I) services both internally to forces 
in Afghanistan and externally to U.S. and coalition forces nations.  As the number of U.S 
personnel increased in late 2001, the military expanded the network procuring 183 tons of 
network and communications equipment in less than 30 days and coordinated the 
delivery to Bagram air base in Afghanistan.118  Upon completion, the site provided 
numerous satellite links and circuits to provide voice, data, and video teleconferencing 
services in “a state of the art communications site-the most modern communications 
facility in the entire country.”119  
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Perhaps the most useful tools in operation have been the tactical satellite radios 
that reliably connect forces regardless of the terrain or space that separates them and the 
U.S. Army’s Global Positioning System, Blue Force Tracker.  The Blue Force Tracker 
allows both headquarters and tactical units a common operational picture, as well as acts 
as a communication system to pass information.  The ability of tactical units to 
communicate with sister units as well as with higher headquarters promoted the 
transmission of information both vertically and horizontally.  This is highlighted in the 
ability of the operation to be controlled from Tampa, Florida, with real-time connectivity 
to air, ground, naval, and Special Operations Forces operating 7000 miles away.  
CENTCOM forces were deployed from 267 bases; operated from 30 locations in 15 
nations; and over-flew 46 nations in the course of operations.  Yet, the ability to “see” the 
battlefield literally and figuratively at each location provided unprecedented situational 
awareness.120 
With this awareness, the synchronization of effects came from the Joint Effect 
Coordination Board (JECB) in the early parts of OEF, and later through the IOWG as the 
theater matured.  The JECB was a targeting board that approved and synchronized the 
targets while managing and allocating resources to achieve targeted effects throughout 
the operations area.121  The synchronization of information supported the actions on the 
ground of various U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan.  The flow of information was 
continuous as U.S forces sought to leverage the truth and use multiple messages through 
multiple channels to achieve desired effects.   
An example of this synchronization was the raid conducted by U.S. Army 
Rangers on October 19, 2001, on a landing strip southwest of Kandahar.  Striking into the 
home of the Taliban spiritual leader, Mullah Omar, the raid served as a warning that 
America could strike when and where it chose, even at the center of the Taliban spiritual 
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strength.  While the raids were to gather intelligence for the possible use of the airstrip, 
the killing of 25 enemy troops and the calling cards left by the rangers had a 
psychological effect on the local population.122  Around the world, news agencies 
reported the successful raid, which had a psychological impact on the U.S. and foreign 
population. 
Pushed to the mountain stronghold of Tora Bora, the remnants of the Al Qaeda 
network fought against an anti-Taliban militia backed by U.S. and U.K. Special Forces 
who had made steady gains across the mountainous terrain.  The U.S., seeking to end the 
conflict, pushed to strike a final blow to the Taliban and Al Qaeda by capturing Osama 
Bin Laden who was believed to be in the area.  Facing an imminent defeat, the terrorist 
negotiated a truce with the local tribal commander.  During this truce, Bin Laden and 
other leaders relocated in preparation to escape when the fighting renewed several days 
later.  Although several hundred fighters were killed during the engagements, Bin Laden 
escaped and the Al Qaeda network survived.  Subsequent to the battle of Tora Bora, the 
coalitions wanted to transition power to the Afghan factions.  The calling of a grand 
council (Loya Jirga) of Afghan factions, tribal leaders, and exiles convened in Kabul to 
establish the new interim Afghan government.     
With the swearing in of Hamid Karzai as the interim president of Afghanistan, the 
U.S. sealed the fate of the transition from the Taliban to a democratic Afghanistan.  The 
military priority of effort in Afghanistan shifted from SOF to conventional operations in 
December 2001, when the effort shifted from defeating the Taliban to helping establish a 
viable, long-term government in Afghanistan.  The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-
180, built around the 10th Mountain Division, would form in June  2002, with the 
Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (CFC-A) assuming responsibility from the 
Combined Force Land Component Command (known as Third Army) forward 
                                                 122 The psychological effect was that the U.S. could conduct operations anywhere against the Taliban 
network with impunity.  This led to the doubt in the ability of the Taliban and its military.   
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headquarters for operations in Afghanistan.123  The CFC-A focused on countrywide 
issues to include coordination with the UN Mandated International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF).  A separate force, CJTF-76, would focus on day-to-day operations for most 
of Southern Afghanistan outside of Kabul. 
Meanwhile, the Taliban and Al Qaeda had not relinquished the idea of controlling 
Afghanistan.  Instead, forces regrouped in the Shahi-Kot Mountains in Afghanistan with 
the intention of using the area as a base of operations to renew hostilities against the 
coalition and the newly founded government.  Using tactics learned battling the Soviets 
in the 1980’s, the mujahedeen style fighters gained strength totaling over 1,000 by early 
2002.  The coalition, believing that several key leaders were present in the valley, 
launched the kinetically focused Operation Anaconda in early March 2002, with the 
intent of removing the estimated 200 insurgents from the region and capturing the key 
leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.124  Between March 2 and March 16, 2002, over 
2,500 U.S. and pro-government Afghan militia battled an estimated 1,000 Al Qaeda and 
Taliban fighters for control of the valley.  The result was the death of approximately 800-
1,000 insurgents and the joint Coalition-Afghan force gaining control of the valley.   
The downfall of the operations was that Taliban and Al Qaeda key leadership 
once again escaped into the border area of Pakistan, where it had established sanctuaries 
among tribal protectors in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA).  This was 
crucial as 5 to 25 man guerrilla units regularly cross the border to conduct attacks.  Using 
hit and run tactics, the guerillas fire rockets at U.S. bases, ambush American and Afghan 
military convoys and patrols, Afghan government facilities, personnel, and non-
governmental organizations providing humanitarian relief.125  Since being driven from 
the country in late 2001 and early 2002, the Taliban with its Al Qaeda backers continue 
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to confront coalition and Afghan forces to this day.  Utilizing the safe havens established 
in the FATA region, the insurgents have managed to reorganize and recruit new fighters 
to conduct offensive operations with relatively little cross border response by coalition 
and Afghan forces.    
Since late 2001, the kinetically focused U.S. forces have applied lessons learned 
from earlier conflicts and began attacking perceptions in place since the Taliban regime 
came to power.  With a campaign of division and surrender, U.S. forces have worked to 
remove public support for the Taliban and convince insurgents to lay down their arms 
and join the coming tide of democratic change.  Utilizing multiple channels that included 
the EC-130J commando solo and SOMS-B radios to broadcast messages on radio and 
television along with posters, leaflets, and handbills, the information has flowed to 
Afghans.126  This effort to shore up the Afghan government was supported by using 
humanitarian assistance and civil military reconstruction projects to garner support of the 
population throughout the country.   
Additionally, CA soldiers provided humanitarian assistance and used coalition 
talking points to conduct face-to-face engagements with the local population.  During the 
initial campaign, soldiers supported humanitarian missions, gave 50,000 blankets and 
10,000 single-family tents to flood and wintertime victims, medically treated 28,000 
people, visited more than 200 villages, and inoculated 40,000 animals for disease.  As the 
interim government stepped into place, CA soldiers assisted in the restoration of farmers 
markets, schools, and most importantly, a viable police force.127  The CA teams made the 
Afghan national police training a critical aspect of their association so that the people of 
Afghanistan could look upon their police as a viable, just authority capable of providing 
security.  
While improvements have been made in numerous provinces, these efforts have 
had limited success as the weak Afghan government is viewed as unable to provide 
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support outside of the capital region.  This view has provided the Taliban an opportunity 
to flow into southern Afghanistan, as seen by the numerous attacks in southern provinces 
from 2003 until present day.  To help counter this surge the U.S. established Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (a shift from the kinetic focus) to aid the reconstruction effort.  In 
January 2006, with the arrival of NATO troops, the focus in southern Afghanistan was to 
form Provincial Reconstruction Teams with the British leading in Helmand Province and 
the Netherlands and Canada both leading similar teams in Orūzgān Province and 
Kandahar Province respectively.  Local Taliban figures voiced opposition to the 
incoming forces and pledged to resist it.128 Today, the U.S. military forces remain 
kinetically focused on defeating the combined Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgency with 
information operations and non-kinetic operation disjointed in the overall plan attack in 
Afghanistan.  
1. Summary 
Operation Enduring Freedom, like most conflicts consists of a complex 
environment that produced numerous uncertainties for the U.S. and coalition forces.  
These uncertainties ranged from the support, willingness, and capability of the ethnic 
militias of the Northern Alliance to the will of the population to rid itself of the Taliban 
regime.  Special Forces, working with loosely affiliated tribes, found themselves as the 
only conduit between the Northern Alliance, often with Special Forces team members 
being the glue between two groups.  There is evidence to support OEF-P as a complex 
and unstable environment, along with evidence to support the fact that IO was integrated 
in the complex Afghan environment.  Elements of IO can be seen from the initial battles 
to today’s conflict and remain a primary element in the fight for the country.  However, 
the complexity of the conflict does not strongly support that the integration or 
employment of IO was due to the complex nature of the conflict.  It was a factor for the 
integration but not the primary reason.    
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Operation Enduring Freedom started as an economy of force conflict with Special 
Forces soldiers augmenting local anti-Taliban forces covered by the lethality of U.S. 
airpower.  The precision targeting of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces allowed the Northern 
Alliance to sweep through the country, reclaim city after city, and push the Taliban and 
Al Qaeda into Pakistan.  While the opportunity to integrate IO existed for the highly 
trained Special Forces, the U.S. commanders’ focus on kinetic requirements often 
outweighed the desire to conduct non-kinetic operations.  This is not to say that IO was 
not conducted (tactical PSYOP, information engagement, and civil military operations), 
just that the integration of these items was not synchronized and coordinated in a manner 
to achieve overall objectives.   
During OEF, the country’s physical constraints on the operational environment 
complicated matters along with limited or no modern infrastructure existing within the 
country.  This adversity drove the communication personnel to solve difficult networking 
solutions.  Units working in the country realized that the years of neglect and war 
required the use of many non-lethal means to gain the confidence of the population.  This 
is evident through the example of the CA teams who worked on humanitarian missions 
giving blankets, tents, medical aid, and veterinary services to inoculate animals for 
disease.129  This integration came as a direct result of the adversity faced in the conflict.   
U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan faced a closed information environment 
controlled by the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  The deployment of tactical networks consisting 
of satellite terminals, telephone switchboards, and data network operation equipment 
which enabled situational awareness from troops on the ground to CENTCOM 
headquarters in Tampa, Florida, with real-time connectivity to a force operating 
thousands of miles away.  The phased building of the tactical network from Uzbekistan, 
to Bagram, to Kandahar, culminated with the development of a state of the art 
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communications facility in the country.130   The vast network provided C4I services, both 
internally and externally, allowed coalition soldiers the ability to communicate with sister 
units as well as with higher headquarters, and promoted the transmission of information 
both vertically and horizontally.   
The ability to collaborate and share information fostered the synchronization of 
IO from the strategic to the tactical level; however, the full capability of IO was 
underutilized due to the limited number of assets and the tendency to use kinetic force 
instead.  The ability to share information both visually and digitally through Blue Force 
Tracker did enable units to operate in a decentralized manner.  This allowed the 
integration of the elements of IO with combat forces to freely collaborate and execute in 
crisis response mode when primary communication were tied up with maneuver units 
coordinating actions.  This network within a network allowed headquarters IO action 
officers to pull information, analyze it without querying the unit in contact, and push 
assets and information back to the unit on the ground.131   
Lessons learned during the conflict spurred the development of a new Army IO 
doctrine to aid in the employment of information operations personnel, tactics, techniques 
and procedures.132  These lesson were learned by U.S. forces who relied heavily on the 
network formations (both human and computer) to act as the conduit of information.  
Human networks provided intelligence on the anti-Afghan forces and acted as a 
means/mode to pass information from U.S. and coalition soldiers to the population.  
Computer networks ensured the dissemination of information gathered among the 
coalition partners and to higher headquarters outside the theater of operations.  As the 
operation matured, an additional lesson learned was the synchronization of IO and who 
coordinated the effects.  Early in the conflict, a small cell of personnel worked to support 
the kinetic operations conducted by the Northern Alliance and supported by SOF teams.  
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As the mission changed, the need for a more robust IO staff element became clear not 
only by the commanders on the ground but also by the Army itself as it moved to the 
modular force structure.  The move to a modular army recognized the increased 
importance of IO and developed the IOWG into a fully capable cell with habitual 
elements of IO working within the construct.133 
Overall, the Afghan theater of operations has displayed that the integration of 
information operations into combat operations remains at a low level.  Over the past 
several years, strides have been made to improve the integration in the Afghan theater 
with the PRT’s as well as with the introduction of new Brigade Combat Teams and their 
new structure, as well as improved strategic and operational IO cells.  These organization 
changes, along with the kinetically focused command environment, tip the scale in favor 
of the organizational frame of reference.  It is important to note that during this conflict, 
the informational frame of reference has played an ever-increasing role in the defeat of 
the Taliban/Al Qaeda.  The collaborative efforts of the U.S. military to work in concert 
with coalition partners (NATO/ISAF/ANF) has highlighted the ability of different 
networks to focus on the adversary by sharing information through technology.  
Adjustments in the command structure now allow a synchronized IO campaign against 
the Taliban.    
D. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (PHILIPPINES) 
In December 2001, the global war on terrorism expanded to include the Philippines.  
OEF (P) arose in response to the kidnappings of U.S. citizens by the Abu Sayyef Group 
(ASG), a radical Muslim organization backed by Al Qaeda.  Members of Special Operations 
Command, Pacific (SOCPAC), headed by Brig. Gen. Donny Wurster, deployed as Joint Task 
Force 510 (JTF 510) to support Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – Philippines in January 
2002, to assist the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) to target this group.134   
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The publicly announced terms forbade active U.S. involvement in combat 
missions.  Instead, U.S. personnel were to train the Philippine troops and leave after six 
months.  The mission on Basilan was to conduct unconventional warfare operations in the 
Southern Philippines by, with, and through the AFP to help the Philippine government 
separate the population from and destroy terrorist organizations.135  The desired end state 
was for the AFP to gain sufficient capability to locate and destroy the ASG, to recover 
hostages, and to enhance the legitimacy of the Philippine government.  The intent was to 
provide all SF elements on Basilan with unifying guidance that would help synchronize 
counter-terrorist operations in the Southern Philippines with initial focus on Basilan.  
Acting as observers/trainers, about 160 Special Forces troops deployed directly on 
the island of Basilan itself.  Another 500 U.S. support soldiers were based in the city of 
Zamboanga and provided sophisticated surveillance information to the 4,000 Filipino 
troops hunting Abu Sayyaf guerrillas.136  Major exercises have taken place during the 
deployment of U.S. forces to include Balikatan 02-1, a much larger Balikatan 02-2. These 
exercises along with Balance Piston 03-05 exercise were designed to enhance tactical and 
operational proficiency of the AFP.  These exercises validated the training of the AFP 
and targeted terrorist groups operating in the Philippines.  Through the assistance of the 
SOF advisers, it is estimated that the number of Abu Sayyaf Group members on Basilan 
Island has decreased to approximately 80 from a prior high of 700, due to the increased 
capability of the AFP.137      
A secondary approach utilized the combined U.S. and AFP military force to 
attack the enemy's stronghold using a robust civil affairs program.  This program 
undercut the terrorist’s campaign as well as strengthened Philippine government 
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institutions and local security, which enabled Filipinos to go about their daily lives 
without the constant fear of terrorism.  Dubbed Operation Smiles, this joint venture of 
U.S. and Philippine personnel provided medical attention, built essential services, and 
improved overall living conditions for the population.  During the operation, 14 schools, 
7 clinics, 3 hospitals, and 20 fresh water wells were constructed as well as providing 
medical, dental, and veterinary programs.138  These synchronized efforts led to much of 
the OEF-Philippines success; the ASG was driven from Basilan and one U.S. hostage 
was recovered.  
The operating environment of the Philippines was complex for a multitude of 
reasons.  First, U.S. operations were limited primarily to Basilan and surrounding waters 
which allowed the JI, ASG, and MILF terrorist organizations to move with relative ease 
throughout three countries and hundreds of their territorial islands.139  Second, a lack of 
understanding of Philippine laws contributed to U.S. political and military leaders’ 
decisions to restrict the employment of SF advisers to a constrictive ROE and operating 
level.  Third, ASG and Al Qaeda had well established connections due to Osama Bin-
Laden's brother-in-law who provided leadership and funding.  Fourth, the lack of 
understanding between the loose affiliation of the ASG and other terrorist organizations 
such as the Jemmah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia or the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) in the Philippines.  Last, because the Philippine government was negotiating a 
peace agreement with the MILF, U.S. leaders prohibited SF units from assisting the AFP 
in MILF-controlled areas.  Because the AFP wanted to work closely with the U.S. 
military, it shifted AFP troops from MILF-controlled areas so more AFP troops could 
benefit from U.S. advice and assistance elsewhere.  This created de facto ASG 
sanctuaries.140 
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With the expansion of the Global War on Terror, the decision to deploy a 
Department of State funded mobile training team to provide the Philippine government 
with a national counterterrorist capability fit with the primary mission of the U.S. Special 
Forces.  With the mission of advising the Armed Forces of the Philippines in combating 
terrorism, Joint Task Force 510 deployed to the Philippines.141  The bulk of the 1,300-
man force consisted of an air component in Mactan, Cebu, as well as staff and support 
personnel located at the JTF headquarters in Zamboanga.  The tip of the U.S. spear 
consisted of 160 SF personnel with later augmentation of a 300 member Naval 
Construction Task Group (see Figure 5).  All U.S. forces operated under restrictive rules 
of engagement.142  
 
Figure 5.     Joint Special Operations Task Force, Philippines Advisory Model  
 
Given the severe restraints on the JTF 510 by ROE and the mission of training 
and advising, the commander of TF 510 sought to reduce the uncertainty and utilize non-
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kinetic/influential means from Gordon McCormick Diamond Model.143  Applying the 
principles found in the Diamond Model within the political constraints of the Philippines 
led to the pursuit of three interconnected lines of operation:  1) Building Philippine 
Armed Forces (AFP) capacity.  U.S. forces trained, advised, and helped Philippine 
security forces create a safe and secure environment.  2) Focused civil-military 
operations.  Philippine-led humanitarian and civic-action projects demonstrated the 
government’s concern for regional citizens and improved their quality of life.  3) 
Information operations (IO).144  With the goal of regional government, the IO campaign 
emphasized the success of the first two lines of operation.     
In comparison to other conflicts, the overall size of the operation was small.  With 
a force reaching a top end number of 1,200, military personnel were to act as advisers and 
logistical support, a mission ideally suited for the Special Forces.  Using organic 
Philippine forces in the lead, SOF advisers and IO personnel (civil affairs, medical 
professionals, and PSYOP) pursued the lines of operations while working side by side 
with Philippine military doctors, nurses, local medical and dental college students, and 
the Philippine Department of Health in the complex environment.  For additional support, 
a contingency force included elements of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit based in 
Okinawa, Japan, and the USS Essex Amphibious Ready Group. Both units were to 
provide support if required which would raise the number of personnel in the Philippines.  
Within the information environment, the Philippines had a well-developed 
communications infrastructure with over 7 million of telephone lines, 41 million plus cell 
phones, 90 plus Internet service providers, multiple AM and FM radio stations, hundreds 
of television broadcast stations and a growing use of the Internet.  From the human 
network system, Abu Sayyef had a distinct advantage over the AFP and U.S. teams.  The 
combination of neglect and lack of military and government initiative created 
circumstances that allowed a growing presence of Abu Sayyef within the local population 
who became reliant on the insurgents for security.  Second, the Philippines had a well-
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established government, which required military operations to play a supporting role to 
efforts managed by the U.S. State Department.  This required synchronizing and 
deconflicting efforts with military planners, U.S. political personnel, and the Embassy 
country team members.    
Military planners realized that the best way to confront a network was to create a 
counter-network, a non-hierarchical organization capable of responding quickly to 
actionable intelligence.145  This required the SOF teams to build relationships with the 
AFP and the local population in an expedited manner, and was accomplished by focusing 
the AFP on common military tasks, and aggressive patrolling in local villages.  To build 
the complete network, U.S. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets were 
integrated into plans and operations.   
From the informational dimension, the local population was encouraged by the 
improving security situation.  This allowed the HUMINT network to blossom, which in 
turn, allowed the AFP and U.S. forces the ability to communicate with the local 
population.  This flow of information from the local population to the AFP and from the 
AFP to the U.S. advisers encouraged both vertical and horizontal intelligence sharing 
between U.S. and Philippine forces.  This illustrated a weakness in the American 
philosophy of information age war and reflects an over-reliance on technological 
solutions at the expense of the human element, which must be the focus in a COIN fight. 
SOF teams also promoted the AFP and Philippine government by putting the AFP 
in the lead in all manner of operations.  AFP personnel and their U.S. advisors 
participated in many civic events such as school graduation ceremonies as well as village 
and provincial meetings.  This reinforced the democratic process and provided the 
common message that the AFP and Philippine government cared about the population. 
Perhaps the most influential dimension in OEF-P was the cognitive dimension.  
Utilizing the Military Information Support Team (MIST) in support of U.S. and 
                                                 145 Colonel Gregory Wilson,  “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the 
Indirect Approach.”  U.S. Army.  
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Philippine government information objectives had increased the population’s level of 
awareness by using newspaper ads, handbills, posters, leaflets, radio broadcasts, and 
novelty items.146  As Colonel Darwin Guerra, battalion commander of the 32d Infantry 
AFP, reported, “Once the people supported rebels and extremists because they felt 
neglected or oppressed by the government.  The delivery of their basic needs like health 
and nutrition services, construction of infrastructure and impact projects, and 
strengthening security in the community that the Balikatan program brought [sic] 
changed their attitudes and loyalty.  As residents began to experience better living 
conditions, they withdrew support from the militants.147 
Attacking the enemy's strategy, the combined U.S. and AFP military force used a 
robust civil affairs program to undercut the terrorists.  This strategy strengthened 
Philippine government institutions and local security to enable Filipinos to go about their 
daily lives without the constant fear of terrorism.  Civic action projects contributed to this 
perception as water supply and distribution systems, mosques, schools, and medical 
services were rebuilt, restored, and reopened.  These actions effectively persuaded the 
population in denying Abu Sayyaf its habitual sanctuary and curtailing the group’s 
movement.148  Because the AFP began to deter attacks and disrupted the terrorists' ability 
to operate in and around the cities, Philippine festivals were able to hold nighttime events 
for the first time.  
1. Summary 
With the expansion of the Global War on Terror, the decision to deploy military 
training teams (JTF 510) to provide the Philippine government with a national 
counterterrorist capability faced a complexity that other theaters had not seen before as 
numerous factors increased the complexity of the operational environment.  The first 
factor of working in a well established political and government system forced 
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restrictions on the training teams.  The second was the lack of understanding in a 
complex networked adversary, and its connections with other local and regional terrorist 
organizations.  Last, the creation of de facto terrorist sanctuaries by redeploying 
government troops that would be trained by U.S. personnel.149  Nonetheless, the high 
level of integration of IO into combat operations was not because of the complexity and 
instability but because the constrictive rules of engagement, command atmosphere, and 
command education which dictated the method of integrating IO into operations.  The 
high level of IO asset integration is evident when looking at structure of the Special 
Forces task force (see Figure 5).  The integration and use of elements of IO (PSYOP, CA, 
PAO, OPSEC) in planning operations, along with the commands stated goal to use 
principles of the McCormick Diamond Model produced the three interconnected lines of 
operation, of which two are squarely information operations.   
JTF 510, facing the severe restrictions (adversity) placed upon it by the political 
structure, overcame these obstacles by utilizing not only historically IO associated 
elements (PSYOP, CA, PAO) but also utilized organic Special Forces soldiers when 
confronted with personnel limitations.150  Special Forces soldiers, trained in Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID), brought the ability to employ IO which enabled the U.S. and AFP 
to focus on indigenous capacity-building efforts.  The organizational structure, training, 
and education of the Special Forces soldiers and leaders indicate that the smaller elite 
units are organizationally better suited to integrate IO.   
While the information environment was conducive to the availability of 
computers and networks, the ability to collaborate internally and externally relied on the 
human network rather than just the speed and efficiency of the computer network.  The 
various networks of personnel (U.S. SOF, AFP, PSYOP, CA, and medical) working in 
concert and synchronized by the JTF headquarters allowed the combined force to present 
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the AFP as a viable, capable, and legitimate entity.  An emphasized public awareness 
campaign brought by a synchronized information operations effort heightened the public 
awareness of the negative effects of terrorism and provided information on how to report 
terrorists, simultaneously show casing the positive steps taken by the government and 
military to foster peace and development.   
The combined U.S. and AFP military force effort to use civil affairs programs 
destabilized the terrorist strategy. The employment of U.S. and Philippine civil affairs 
assets strengthened the Philippine government position, while providing greatly needed 
essential service to the population.  This approach of using civic action projects 
contributed to a change in perception about the government and its ability to care for the 
people.  At the same time, these projects provided opportunities to tap into the “bamboo 
telegraph,” the indigenous information network.151  This is reflected as villagers openly 
shared information on the local situation after they had become more comfortable with 
AFP and U.S. forces. 
Overall, OEF-P provides a very prominent example of how to integrate 
information operations into combat operations.  The collaborative effect of organizational 
and information theories have enabled the successful campaign of the combined U.S. and 
Philippine forces to see positive results over the seven-year venture.     
E. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 
On March 19, 2003, President George W. Bush authorized an air strike on a small 
farm just outside Baghdad where the Iraqi leadership was supposed to be gathering.  
Once aircraft had departed Iraqi airspace, President Bush announced, “Coalition forces 
are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to 
defend the world from grave danger.”152  This strike began Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
which was the first pre-emptive war of the Global War on Terror.  The stated military 
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objectives of the invasion were the removal of Sadaam Hussein from power; the 
elimination of weapons of mass destruction; to gather intelligence and the elimination of 
Islamic terrorists; to distribute humanitarian aid; to secure Iraq’s oil infrastructure; and 
assist in creating a representative government as a model for other Middle East nations.    
During the force buildup and the initial stages of the invasion, IO forces, as shown 
in Figure 6, concentrated on shaping the Iraqi theater of operations.  Utilizing a 
combination of PYSOP, EW, Public Affairs, and Physical Destruction, the military 
focused on the capitulation of the military, defection of military leaders, and compliance 
of the population.  Focusing on the Iraqi military, the original IO plan called for PSYOP 
leaflets to drop on units for several days encouraging the soldiers to capitulate.  The most 
capable units of the Iraqi army never received these leaflets; coalition aircraft attacked 
these units without warning.   
 
 
Figure 6.    OIF-1 Major Combat Operations153  
 
                                                 153 Greg Fontenot, E.J. Degan, David Tohm, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (Annapolis: Naval Press Institute, 2005), 441-495. 
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At the end of the “no attack grace period,” any unit that had not followed the 
instructions was attacked.  This follow through of delivered messages had a large 
psychological impact on the remaining units.  Utilizing airborne assets enabled the U.S. 
military to reach 90% of the military and population with themes and messages 
distributed through leaflets, radio, handbills, and television broadcasts.  This resulted in 
many of the military units virtually throwing down their weapons and returning home 
instead of returning to their garrisons, as well as the eased the passage of U.S. forces 
through many southern Iraqi cities. 
In addition to the PYSOP element, there were also different deception efforts 
during the advance to Baghdad.  The first was to confuse Saddam about the axis of the 
primary attack.  To accomplish this, Special Forces attacked and destroyed Iraqi 
surveillance posts on the Jordanian border in order to give the impression that the main 
attack would come from the Western Desert of Iraq.  The second deception held out the 
possibility of attack from Turkey.  USCENTCOM gave the impression that the 4th 
Infantry Division was to land in Turkey and attack through the northern portion of 
Iraq.154  U.S. Central Commands’ intent was to keep the Nebuchadnezzar Republican 
Division in the north until it was too late to affect operations south of Baghdad.  The last 
deception involved the Adnan Republican Guard Division and its outlook of where the V 
Corps’ attack would come from, preventing the relocation of the division in an attempt to 
defeat the coalitions attack.155 
As coalition forces crossed into theater, they had access to several vital elements 
of IO.  Attached to every division was a Tactical PSYOP Company (TPC), combat 
camera teams, and a mobile public affairs detachment (MPAD) capable of conducting 
offensive IO as units moved towards Baghdad.  These assets, while attached to each 
division, presented command and control issues while trying to support their units.  This 
was especially true for PSYOP and the ability to create products that better supported the 
division missions.  Because the PSYOP product approval process required the 
Commander of USCENTCOM approval, newly created products were often overcome by 
                                                 154 Tommy Franks, American Soldier.  New York: Harper-Collins.  2004. 429, 435, and 500. 
155 Ibid. 
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events before PSYOP units could reach the local audience with pertinent information.  
More important was the inclusion of the U.S. and international media with ground forces 
during the invasion.  The U.S. invasion of Iraq was the most widely and closely reported 
war in military history with 775 reporters and photographers traveling as “embedded 
journalists” with U.S. forces, with hundreds more taking their chances outside the 
Humvees.156 
Coalition forces overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein in just three weeks 
utilizing a force half the size of the Iraqi Army.  On April 21, 2003, the coalition 
provisional authority (CPA) was established vesting itself with executive, legislative, and 
judicial authority over the Iraqi government.  The transition from combat operations to a 
mission of defeating insurgent forces made up of former military officers, disgruntled 
former Baathist, Sunni Arabs, foreign fighters, and suspected Al Qaeda supporters 
increased the complexity as U.S. commanders failed to properly plan for phase 4 
(stability) operations.   
The information operations force structure working to defeat the insurgency faced 
an increasingly complex and hostile operational environment.  Organizationally, U.S. 
forces faced internal and external challenges while trying to complete the complex task of 
defeating insurgents and supporting the CPA.  Initially, coalition forces did a meager job 
of integrating IO with the CJTF-7 keeping the organic hierarchical staff structure, while 
commanders of the subordinate divisions utilized the Bosnian model to organize the staff, 
to synchronize IO, to reconstruct infrastructure, and to conduct combat operations.  It was 
not until the arrival of the III Armored Corps staff in 2004 that the CJTF-7 (later MNFI) 
organized into IO working cells.  While the organic structure of the coalition forces 
allocated IO cells at the JTF and CPA, only one division had a functional area 30 
(information operations officer) assigned as the other divisions relied on the Fire Support 
Element (FSE) to coordinate and synchronize efforts.  This often resulted in IO programs 
disconnected from other operations.  Complicating matters further, leaders in CPA and  
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CJTF-7 had no understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the assets at its 
disposal.  This led to inconsistent messages at the various levels of coalition forces and 
later the interim Iraqi government. 
The external challenges consisted of facing an increasingly hostile information 
environment composed of the Arab street (rumor mill), devoted Iraqi media outlets, 
foreign satellite broadcasts like Al Jazeera, international media, and the increasing 
insurgency.  The coalition’s ability to reach the Iraqi populace became problematic due to 
USCENTCOM’s decision to attack the radio and TV transmitters at onset of hostilities.  
This took away Sadaam’s ability to communicate but the side effect of the attacks was 
the destruction of the nationwide radio and TV networks.  Coalition forces would not feel 
the impact of this decision until they realized that coalition equipment was not capable of 
reaching the entire country, which meant that the CPA and later the Interim Iraqi 
government had no way to deliver messages to the country.  
With the dissolution of the CPA and the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) taking 
charge in 2004, the IO structure of coalition forces remained the same.  The one 
exception was the 3rd Infantry Division which was in a partial modularized configuration.  
Although this division had an increased IO cell, the division struggled to keep pace with 
adversaries’ information campaigns.  To combat this shortage and lack of experience, the 
U.S. military sought to employ contractors to provide IO support to coalition forces in 
Iraq.  The Lincoln Group was selected by the Department of Defense to lead the effort to 
publicize events in Iraq.  The error in this selection was that, unlike the numerous public 
relations firms that existed, the Lincoln Group had zero experience in public relations.  
This inexperience led to a major problem when the group tried to generate stories (often 
false) written by the coalition and pass them off as Iraqi generated stories.  This led to the 
loss of U.S. credibility and the belief that the coalition was trying to deceive the Iraqi 
population. 
During this period, the practice of face-to-face engagements became a major 
element of the information operation arsenal.  The military leaders coordinated effort of 
meeting with key leaders at every level of the Iraqi governorate allowed the passage of 
key talking points that covered recent, positive events.  The information operations cells 
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coordinated whom and at what level local leadership would be engaged, as well as track 
information that was passed and received from these engagements.  Although the talking 
points did not vary from week to week, they provided focus for subordinate units when 
meeting with local Iraqis.           
The current government of Iraq took office on May 20, 2006, following approval 
by the members of the Iraqi National Assembly.  This followed the general election in 
December 2005.  With the return of sovereignty to the Iraqis, the coalition mission 
remained focused on defeating insurgents (later known as Anti-Iraqi forces) and building 
a national military and police force.  During this period, the military fell under control of 
two command structures.  The strategic level command was the Multi-National Force- 
Iraq, a command focused on strategic issues as well as coordination with the U.S. 
Embassy and New Iraqi government.  The operational level command was the Multi-
National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) which focused on day to day fighting of the insurgency and 
reconstruction efforts.  It was during this period (OIF 5 and later), that organic IO 
personnel arrived with the modular structured brigades and divisions.  Armed with a 
public affairs officer, a psychological operations soldier, a computer network operations 
officer FA53, a civil affairs officer/soldier, and an information operations officer, these 
restructured units were capable of offensive and defensive operations in the information 
dimension.  These organic personnel gave the units the capability of assessing, analyzing, 
and defending information attacks, as well as, conducting offensive attacks against the 
terrorist organizations and networks from the tactical to the strategic level.  This 
improved the vertical and horizontal synchronization of messages as IO cells collaborated 
and synchronized efforts from the soldier on the ground to MNFI.    
The increase in the automation infrastructure enabled the synchronization of 
personnel within the newly organized modular forces.  Each unit now had an organic 
signal company with the Joint Network Node (JNN) system.  The Joint Network Node is 
the central communications switching shelter that contains a Promina 400 to provide joint 
standard tactical entry point/Defense Information System Network connectivity (Non-
secure Internet Protocol Router, Secret Internet Protocol Router, Defense Switched 
Network Defense Red Switch Network and Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
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Communications System) and uses an Ethernet backbone for internal/external 
connectivity.157  This network allowed communications between the Brigade Main 
command post, Brigade Support Area command post, and Battalion command posts, 
which in turn fostered the sharing of information and a common operating picture. 
To synchronize, to coordinate, and to deconflict the IO efforts, units began 
moving away from the Fire Support Element and the Effect Coordination Cell to the 
functional IOWG.  The IOWG led by a trained IO professional at every major level of 
war (tactical to strategic), enabled a better understanding and employment of the 
elements of IO.  The IOWG brought together all the core supporting and related activities 
of IO and synchronized efforts to support the overall actions of the unit in the operational 
environment.  Information passed through the same basic channels as prior rotations in 
Iraq (PAO, PSYOP, U.S., and international media); the difference was the 
synchronization and harmonizing of themes, messages, and deeds of military units at the 
various levels.  However, a major flaw was that commanders and IO practitioners alike 
used their own experience and bias to interpret the meaning of doctrine along with how 
IO should be integrated into combat operations.  While some units achieved success, 
others saw minimal results because they just did not believe in IO or the personnel 
running the programs were inexperienced.158  This struggle to integrate IO by 
commanders resulted in units developing their own methods for integrating IO.  As 
Colonel Ralph Baker stated “I quickly discovered that IO was going to be one of the two 
most vital tools (along with human intelligence) I would need to be successful in a 
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.”159  Most failures integrating IO were the result of 
the commander failing to visualize the complete operational environment and the IO 
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officer failing to assist the commander.  As a result, IO was viewed in terms of good 
news (inform) rather than changing and shaping perceptions of the target audiences. 
In 2007, the U.S. President proposed 21,500 more troops for Iraq and an increase 
in reconstruction proposals with $1.2 billion for funding.160  The troops, along with the 
new commander of MNF-I General David Petraeus, set forth a new strategy of opening a 
large number of smaller outposts, with troops living amongst the population.  This 
dispersed approach along with the increased independent local, national, and international 
media coverage of our military operations proved critical to the success in the global 
information environment.  Enemy activities were highlighted while coalition and Iraqi 
forces worked side-by-side, which reflected cohesion between the two forces.   
“Surge” units now operated in the new modular brigade combat team 
configuration, which increased the integration of IO forces on the ground and the ability 
of units living in the smaller outpost to integrate IO into combat operations.  Although the 
number and type of IO elements remained the same, the training of combat troops 
returning to Iraq was modified to include engagement and cultural training. This training 
allowed the soldier on the ground to conduct tactical IO.  This force multiplier increased 
the reach of coalition and Iraqi themes and messages that resulted in a dramatic decrease 
in attacks and civilian deaths.   
1. Summary 
When examining the conflict in Iraq, it is easy to see the important role that both 
organizational and informational theories have made on the ability of military units to 
integrate IO into overall combat operations and work within the greater construct of the 
operational environment.  Both organizational and information theory would point to the 
same outcome of integration.  The complex environment of combat and the need for the 
coalition to work with a multitude of partners would point to multiple liaisons and 
multiple coordination processes to ensure synchronization.  The added physical network 
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capability of the U.S. forces enabled the collaboration across the coalition as well as 
vertical and horizontal collaboration within U.S. forces. 
The smaller, highly trained U.S. Special Forces were capable of conducting 
operations in support of IO as in the deception operations during the initial phases of the 
invasion.  However, the mission changed to one of precision strikes and capture of high 
value targets.  The spectrum of IO support focused on a very narrow dimension of 
psychological and physical rather than full spectrum IO.  Planners at all levels had to 
account for the second and third order effects that a Special Forces mission would often 
involve in their area of operation once the SOF teams had departed. 
Over the course of OIF, the evolution of IO has taken very positive steps towards 
the integration into operations.  As Colonel Ralph Baker found, “I was somewhat 
surprised to find myself spending 70 percent of my time working and managing my 
intelligence and IO systems and a relatively small amount of my time directly involved 
with the traditional maneuver and fire support activities.”161  This shift in command 
attitude ensured that IO received the attention and resources to accomplish required tasks.  
This sentiment was echoed by the III Corps commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General 
Thomas Metz, who declared a “broader and more aggressive, comprehensive, and holistic 
approach to IO – an approach that recognizes the challenges of the global information 
environment and seamlessly integrates the functions of traditional IO and PA – is 
required to succeed on the information – age battlefield.”162  These positive changes also 
came in the form of the Army’s shift to the Modular Brigade Combat Teams’ structure.  
 The lessons learned over the past years of waging OIF are evident specifically in 
the IO arena.  Not only has the number of trained IO personnel increased, but so has the 
organic structure within combat units.  The military learned that using information in 
combat requires more than a small number of IO professionals at the strategic level (like 
the beginning of the war), rather it requires multiple professionals at all levels to 
synchronize the efforts of the command (like current force structure in Iraq).  Every 
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rotation has brought forth new internal and external challenges and adversity as the U.S. 
military mindset and our adversary constantly adapt to the evolving informational and 
operational environment.   
The next lesson focused internally, as the U.S. military experienced an increase in 
network capacity (both human and computer) which allowed a rapid transfer of 
information from the battlefield to commanders.  Using this high volume of information, 
commanders began to use IO as a filter to determine appropriate responses and actions.  
As Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli stated “The commander who prevails in the 
information war is almost certain to win the war itself.”163 The increased speed and 
reliability of information that passed from the human network (physical) to the computer 
network and from the tactical to the strategic levels, allowed commanders and staffs alike 
to analyze the information and quickly generate a response either kinetic (raid, patrol 
show of force) or non-kinetic (press release, PSYOP product, Humanitarian Assistance).   
                                                 163 Peter W. Chiarelli, Lieutenant General, USA, “Learning From Our Modern Wars:  the Imperatives 
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V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
A. FINDINGS 
The integration of IO into combat operations has made progress since Bosnia in 
the 1990’s.  However, U.S. leaders continue to wrestle with the understanding of what 
exactly IO is and how to employ the synchronized elements to utilize this combat 
multiplier.  The new operational environment in which we now operate forces 
commanders to win kinetic operations and face non-kinetic dilemmas where tactical 
problems become strategic issues.  The four case studies have supporting evidence for 
each of the frame of reference propositions outlined in chapter three.  
While complexity will remain a part of warfare, the IO organization now brings 
information requirements that address how information environmental factors might 
affect kinetic operations.  Due to the lethality of technologically advanced weapons 
systems, the risk to combatants and noncombatants will increase as the tendency of 
adversaries to operate among the population increases.  The complex environment will 
require militaries to seek precise means to solve complex problems while reducing 
collateral damage to the population and infrastructure.  The complexity is evident in each 
of the four case studies as the U.S. military sought to bring about a change in the level of 
peace and/or stability of a country during the conflict.  However, the complexity did not 
force commanders to integrate IO into combat operations.  For that reason, the lack of 
evidence has disproved organizational propositions number one.  
The Special Forces motto, de oppresso liber (Latin: “to free from oppression”) 
reflects the historical mission of guerrilla warfare against an occupying power.  Special 
Forces have always sought to bring about change through direct or indirect action.  Their 
eight stated missions; unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, special 
reconnaissance, direct action, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, psychological 
operations, and information operations point to these highly trained units integrating IO.  
Over the course of the four case studies, evidence supports organizational proposition 
number two.  For example, in OEF-P, JTF 510 shows a high level of integration.  Facing 
 86
the severe restrictions placed upon it by the political structure, JTF 510 overcame these 
obstacles by using organic Special Forces soldiers to conduct IO when confronted with 
personnel limitations.164  Special Forces soldiers trained in Foreign Internal Defense 
(FID) brought the ability to employ IO, which enabled the U.S. and AFP to focus on 
indigenous capacity-building efforts.  A second supporting example comes from Bosnia 
when Special Forces JCO teams organized into functional areas to focus on specific 
warring factions and critical areas within the community.  Working in functional teams 
allowed the JCO to accurately read the sentiment of the population and notify their higher 
headquarters of impending problems or unrest before they occurred.  The organizational 
structure as well as training and education of the Special Forces soldiers and leaders 
indicates that the smaller elite units are organizationally better suited to integrate IO 
confirming organizational proposition number two. 
The U.S. Army’s new FM 3-0 states, “Commanders devise and execute plans that 
complement the actions of the other instruments of national power in a focused, unified 
effort.  To this end, operational commanders draw on experience, knowledge, education, 
intellect, intuition, and creativity.”165  Organizational proposition number three focuses on 
the commanders’ ability to use operational art to integrate IO into combat operations.  
Field commanders who chose to integrate IO are evident in each of the four case studies 
selected for this thesis.  There is also evidence that other factors drove commanders to 
integrate IO rather than integrating from the start of the operation.  In Bosnia and OEF-P, 
constrictive rules of engagement and command atmosphere dictated the need to integrate 
IO into combat operations.  Regardless of how they arrived at the need for integration, 
commands in each of the studies did integrate IO based on commanders’ positive 
guidance and belief in the need for IO.  In OEF-A and OIF, the integration of IO did 
occur but not in a synchronized manner until later rotations (2006 to present).  Instead, 
the IO campaign lacked unity of effort with the kinetic operations that dominate the 
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Afghan theater of operation.  The command atmosphere has a major impact on the 
integration of IO but often due to necessity and other factors rather than this independent 
proposition.  
Many historical references support how defeat or adversity has spurred change 
within the military in some manner.  The U.S. military is a good example when it 
changed between World War I and World War II and again after Vietnam.  Looking at 
the four case studies, change did occur as in other conflicts based on adversity rather than 
on defeat.  The first example of change due to adversity comes from Bosnia, where U.S. 
forces constrained by rules of engagement and the enforcement of the Dayton Peace 
Accords were forced from historically lethal tasks of finding, fixing, and eliminating the 
enemy.  Instead, U.S. forces were required to conduct non-traditional tasks that informed, 
deceived, exploited, and influenced the former warring factions and the civilian 
population.  This led to groundbreaking development of tactics techniques and 
procedures still used today.     
The next example comes from the overall GWOT (OEF-A/P, OIF) where Al 
Qaeda has been very effective in its use of information warfare against the U.S. and 
coalition partners.  Using disinformation and propaganda, Al Qaeda has been virtually 
unchecked in furthering their information objectives.  The terrorists are resourceful, 
innovative, and diverse when it comes to the use of information operations at the strategic 
level. This allows them to expand and maintain ideological support while influencing key 
personnel and general population.  News outlets such as CNN, FOXNEWS, BBC, and Al 
Jazeera have been unwitting (or sometimes willing) accomplices in delivering the 
terrorist message to both the Arab and world audiences.  The terrorist use of this type of 
medium has been very effective in a counter will campaign on the key leaders of the 
United States and other countries.166 
To combat Al Qaeda’s use of information warfare, the U.S. has adopted a similar 
mentality on the use of information.  Integrating information operations has allowed 
                                                 166  Martin C Libicki  and National Defense University.  Institute for National Strategic Studies.  “What 
is Information Warfare?”  Strategic Forum.  Vol. 28.  Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995. 
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military forces to capture the perception of target audiences, profit from truthful 
information, and take full advantage of enemies’ misrepresentation of events which has 
tipped the scales in favor of the U.S. forces in the varying theaters of operation.  The 
main factor of this change is the handling of information from the tactical (on the ground) 
level to the combatant commander at the strategic level.  Synchronizing and nesting 
information campaigns with higher-level goals and objectives provide unity of effort 
while organizationally providing organic personnel at lower levels of warfare.  These 
examples show how the adversity faced in the case studies verifies organizational 
proposition number four.  
The advancement of military technology and the technology revolution seen 
throughout the world undoubtedly has made an impact on the ability of the U.S. military 
to conduct operations around the globe.  This impact is seen in the volumes of 
information passed over the clusters of networks that connected NATO headquarters with 
the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, to the vast patchwork-operating 
environment within the tactical units, to the functional information chain linking public 
information officers together.  It is clear that the speed and efficiency of information 
allowed U.S. forces to integrate IO into its operation in Bosnia with a near-real-time 
situational awareness that allowed the staff elements to quickly analyze and take 
appropriate action.  In OEF-A and OIF, the use of the technology has allowed 
information to pass from tactical units on the ground to headquarters located thousands of 
miles away.  The clarity of the situation on the ground through live video feeds, 
instantaneous updates, and a common operating picture have created the opportunity for 
U.S. leaders to become proactive instead of reactive to adversary kinetic and non-kinetic 
attacks.  However, as seen in OEF-A and OIF, the increase in information does not 
necessarily mean that commanders will integrate IO thus disproving informational 
proposition number one. 
The longer a conflict, the more likely militaries learn to adapt to the changing 
adversary.  The U.S., operating in World War II and Korea, saw the adjustment of tactics, 
techniques, and equipment, which in turn, gave them a decisive edge over adversaries.  In 
the four case studies, U.S. forces have highlighted the ability to follow suit by developing 
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new TTP’s for the integration of IO into combat operations.  In Bosnia, the personnel 
who worked to integrate IO pioneered the ability to synchronize the staff at the various 
levels of war.  This was accomplished first by gaining the confidence of the commander, 
then by developing a working group to ensure everyone understood what was required, 
and followed by the establishment of the IO working group that is in use to this day.  In 
OEF-A, Special Forces soldiers utilizing the tactical network posted suspected targeting 
information to a tactical webpage which resulted in the destruction of Taliban and Al 
Qaeda forces in an efficient manner.  This soon became the norm when conventional 
forces arrived and the collaboration of information occurred between kinetic and non-
kinetic information reached tactical and operational headquarters.   
Perhaps the best example of the military learning curve is provided by OIF.  The 
kinetic focused actions of the invading forces quickly defeated the Iraqi Army and 
deposed the Saddam regime.  The failure to integrate IO and plan for the collapse of the 
government resulted in looting, violence, and chaos immediately following the military 
victory.  Over the course of the conflict, the steady integration of IO at the various levels 
of warfare and the shift from the kinetic to non-kinetic focused operations has resulted in 
an established democratic Iraqi government, a dramatically improved security situation, 
and an improved quality of life for the Iraqi citizens.  Informational proposition number 
two is viably supported throughout the case studies.  
Examining information proposition number three, it is important to understand 
how networks are viewed in this specific instance.  For the purposes of this study, 
networks are both technological and social.  From the technological standpoint, many of 
the points made with information proposition number one are valid with this proposition.  
The ability of military units to interconnect and share information in an expedited manner 
enables commanders and staffs to quickly analyze and respond depending on the 
situation.  Today’s technology provides higher echelon commands to develop the 
operational and strategic response while the tactical fight is ongoing.   
From the social network aspect, there is both an internal and external view 
required.  Internally, the vertical and horizontal synchronization of the IO elements 
allowed the reallocation of assets to meet shortfalls, unify effort, and prevent IO 
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fratricide.  A primary example of the internal human network is the Special Forces teams 
who were located and collaborated with anti-Taliban militias during the offensive on 
Mazari Sharif.  Team members talked via radio to synchronize efforts, while at the same 
time, they called in air strikes against Taliban positions.  Externally, the network 
encompassed ally collaboration, the human intelligence, and population engagement.  
This key network determined sentiment of the population, potential targets, and 
communication exchange with the various outside sources.  Two primary examples of the 
external network were the JCO teams that operated in Bosnia and the civil affairs teams 
operating in the Philippines. 
 The most important aspect of the network is the ability take the data, filter it into 
usable information, and present it in a manner allowing the commander to make an 
informed decision.  Ultimately, it is greater networking that will foster integration if the 
information is presented in a manner that commanders and staffs find useful.   
The netcentric warfare approach suggests that modern military environments are 
far too complex to be understood by any one individual, organization, or even military 
service.  The rapid and effective sharing of information enabled by today’s information 
technology permits the U.S. military the ability to “pull” information from ubiquitous 
repositories (i.e., tactical units), rather than having centralized agencies (strategic 
headquarters) attempt to anticipate their information needs and “push” it to them.  All 
four cases have examples of this approach embedded in them.  In Bosnia two examples 
standout, first was a practice known as “skip-echeloning” were Washington-based 
commands and IFOR headquarters elements occasionally used networks to bypass 
intervening organizations in order to exchange information requirements firsthand with 
tactical units.  This ability while beneficial to the higher headquarters sometimes left the 
broader community in the dark.  The second is the collaboration of the public information 
officers who faced the reality of falling behind in the information war.  With the area of 
operation saturated with media, the PIOs created an adhoc network to share information 
which enabled them to release quality, firsthand information to the media thus enabling 
the coalition side of the story to come out first.  
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In OEF-A, the rapid building and expansion of the tactical network enabled first 
the Special Forces soldiers operating with the Northern Alliance and later the 
conventional forces operating in country the ability to share information quickly both 
vertically and horizontally.  This collaboration resulted in the quick collapse of the 
Taliban and in recent rotations, the ability to counter misrepresented press releases and 
propaganda.  Using three networks (SOF, U.S. conventional, and NATO) to attack the 
Taliban has enabled the sluggish Afghan government the ability to survive. 
In OEF-P, military planners realized that the best way to confront a network was 
to create a counter-network, a non-hierarchical organization capable of responding 
quickly to actionable intelligence.167  This counter network coupled with a multipronged 
approach of embedded advisors with AFP and a robust civil affairs program undercut the 
terrorists support base.  Combining U.S. and Philippine efforts strengthened Philippine 
government institutions and local security as SOF teams promoted the AFP and 
Philippine government by putting them in all manner of operations.  This behind the 
scenes approach was very effective as the multiple uses of networks won the support of 
the population. 
In OIF, the invasion serves as a good example of synchronizing the various 
network activities to accomplish a military task.  The U.S. advanced on Baghdad using 
two axis of advance and multiple SOF attacks to disrupt the Iraqi decision cycle.  The 
internally and externally network connected forces communicated progress and 
impediments to higher headquarters (internal), while daily press briefings and the 
embedded reporters provided live feeds to world audience about the invasion (external).  
This rapid flow information confused Iraqi decision makers and resulted in the collapse 
of the Iraqi Army and the subsequent fall of the Saddam Hussein Regime.  During the 
“Surge” operations in 2007, the new strategy of opening a large number of smaller 
outposts with troops living amongst the population facilitated the smaller networks 
(tactical units often company sized) to provide larger input and output of information.  
                                                 167 Colonel Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the 
Indirect Approach.”  U.S. Army.  
http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume5/january_2007/1_07_1.html (accessed 
November 6, 2008). 
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The example from OIF along with the examples from Bosnia, OEF-A, and OEF-P 
confirm that using a netcentric approach to warfare does allow easier integration for 
units.   
B. CONCLUSION 
The integration of IO into combat operations has made progress since operations 
in Bosnia.  However, U.S. leaders continue to wrestle with the understanding of what 
exactly IO is and how to employ the synchronized elements to utilize this combat 
multiplier.  The new operational environment in which the U.S. military now operates 
forces commanders to win kinetic operations and face non-kinetic dilemmas where 
tactical problems become strategic issues.  The four case studies have supporting 
evidence for each of the frame of reference proposition outlined in chapter three.  While 
each of the frames of reference has support as having more explanatory impact on the 
integration of IO, the two frames of reference used in combination appears to have the 
best overall results when integrating IO into combat operations. 
Two propositions have the greatest impact on the integration of IO in this thesis.  
First, the attitude of command (positive and negative) will determine whether integration 
of IO occurs (OFR#3).  Without the proper command atmosphere, the integration of 
information operations will simply not occur.  Commanders who do not believe in the 
usefulness of IO will focus on kinetic operations instead of a full spectrum view using all 
the elements of combat power.  This is evident in the early stage of OIF and OEF-A, 
where commanders were kinetically focused and IO efforts were only an afterthought.  
Second, the greater availability of information technology fosters the integration of IO 
(IFR #1).  The increased availability of technology enables military units to share 
information both vertically and horizontally which allows greater situational awareness.  
These technological networks provide a common operating picture for higher echelon 
commands, which allows operational and strategic planners the ability to respond while 
the tactical fight is ongoing.  This has resulted in the death of key insurgent leaders in 
Afghanistan as well as the countering of propaganda and exploitation of military success 
in all four theaters.  
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The U.S. military has usually made advancements in times of adversity.  These 
transformations have brought about some of the greatest innovations in organization, as 
well as tactics allowing the U.S. to achieve some of the greatest military victories in 
history.  The current conflicts and the military facing those conflicts is no different from 
any of our historic predecessors who transformed their militaries during and after epic 
struggles.  The Global War on Terror has shown that the military must learn to adapt 
quickly to overcome a flexible enemy who does not follow a set of guidelines to wage 
war.168  The battle hardened professional soldiers must continue to spearhead the call for 
change and push this generation into the same type of “renaissance” that occurred in the 
1860s and again in the 1920s and 1940s.169  It is the author’s belief that the integration of 
information operations is paramount to the future of the military force and that without a 
change in military mindset, we will be caught short like the attack on September 11, 
2001, and the information campaign conducted by Al Qaeda.   
 
                                                 168  Steven Metz, “Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American strategy.”  Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2008.  
169  James M. McCaffrey, “The Army in Transformation.” 1790-1860. The Greenwood Press “Daily 
Life through History” Series.  Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006.  
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